

The Failure of *Ch'ilinch ŏngsan* and Obstruction of Nation's Future*

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This paper seeks to put *ch'ilinch ŏngsan* into proper historical perspective, to examine the process of the redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese collaborators and the related internal conditions of Chosŏn society at the time of liberation, and to reconstruct the structural factors that led to the failure of the redress. Also necessary is to examine the US military government's policy in empowering the *ch'ililp'a* (pro-Japanese group) and its structure, which made any attempt of *ch'ilinch ŏngsan* thereafter impossible. In particular, this paper will attempt to highlight the major weakness of existing research on the issue of pro-Japanese. Previous studies have concluded that the Rhee Syngman regime is to be solely responsible for the failure of *ch'ilinch ŏngsan*. This is to focus only on the end point of a historical process resulting from ignoring a structuralist explanation that locates the structural factors that led to the final event.

Along with an analysis of the North Korean process of *ch'ilinch ŏngsan*, this paper further examines the *ch'ililp'a* related policies of the first South Korean regime, the Rhee Syngman regime with the structural limitations given by the US policies, which reproduced and expanded the pro-Japanese group's power base and basically handed the nation over to the pro-Japanese group and their descendants.

Keywords: ch'ililp'a ch'ŏngsan (redressing and punishing the pro-Japanese group), the US occupation policy in Korea, liberation period

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1. Introduction

On February 28, 2002, 57 years after liberation, members of the National Assembly for restoration of national spirit announced for the first time in Korean constitutional history the list of 708 pro-Japanese figures¹. Chung Dong-young, a permanent advisor to the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), demanded that Lee Hoi-chang, president of the Grand National Party (GNP), speak frankly about the pro-Japanese acts of his father saying, “ his father ’s acts of changing his name to Japanese (ch ǎngssigaemyōng), and passing the prosecutor ’s appointment examination after serving in the prosecutor ’s office of the Japanese Government General of Korea (JGGK), which carried out the imprisoning and torturing of independent fighters, are clearly pro-Japanese deeds. ” In response, the spokesman of the GNP warned, “ we will not stand the slandering of the Toyota regime ” and added that “ President Kim Dae-jung volunteered to play a role of a Japanese soldier at a school play in his youth, and called himself Toyota when he talked to his old Japanese teacher. ” As such, it not only brought a sharp confrontation among the most powerful elites in our society but also had a huge impact in other areas, such as the media. Rep. Suh Sang-suhp, Chairman of the List Review Committee, complained saying, “ The *Chosun Ilbo* was constantly on my back as though it was interrogating me. Fifty years have passed since liberation but the influence of the pro-Japanese collaborators and their followers is still strong. ”

These are just a few examples which go to show that *ch inilmunje* (the issue of pro-Japanese collaboration and injustices) is not only a past history of the colonial and liberation periods, but is also very much part of our modern time. Vice-chair of the Panmintŭkwi (Special Commission for Korean Traitors) Kim Sang-don called for the ‘ *yŏksaparo-seugi* (restoration of history) ’ saying, “ Without a proper redress of the pro-Japanese injustices, we cannot have law and order in

1. The pro-Japanese group, *ch inilp ǎ*, is defined as “ a person who has consciously collaborated in the colonial domination, invasions, and depredation of the Korean national rights under Japanese Imperialism ” in accordance with the definition given at the public hearing for the compilation of the list of pro-Japanese figures.

our new nation ”and has proven to be closer to the truth of history than Rhee Syngman ’s call for ‘ *yõksatõp õdugi* (Let history pass) ’ at which time he said, “ Let us not be troubled by the past which may turn out to be an obstacle for our future. ” If *ch inilch õngsan* (the redress or settlement of the pro-Japanese collaboration and injustice) was carried out properly, President Kim Dae-jung could not have freely visited his colonial teacher, nor could the leader of the main opposition party have run for the presidency having gotten caught up in controversy about his father being pro-Japanese.

This paper seeks to put *ch inilch õngsan* into proper historical perspective, to examine the process of the redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese collaborators and the related internal conditions of Chosõn society at the time of liberation, and to reconstruct the structural factors that led to the failure of the redress. Also necessary is to examine the US military government ’s policy in empowering the *ch inilp ʼa* (pro-Japanese group) and its structure, which made any attempt of *ch inilch õngsan* thereafter impossible. In particular, this paper will attempt to highlight the major weakness of existing research on the issue of pro-Japanese. Previous studies have concluded that the Rhee Syngman regime is to be solely responsible for the failure of *ch inilch õngsan*. This is to focus only on the end point of a historical process resulting from ignoring a structuralist explanation that locates the structural factors that led to the final event.

The existing research has failed to explain the point that even if a different regime other than Rhee Syngman ’s had come into office with the approval of the US, the result may have been the same. If we examine the East Asian policies of the US after World War II, it is clear that most of the countries, including the Philippines, failed to redress and punish pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-nationalists due to the reactionary occupational policies of the US.

This paper will further examine the *ch inilp ʼa* related policies of the first South Korean regime, the Rhee Syngman regime with the structural limitations given by the US policies, which reproduced and expanded the pro-Japanese group ’s power base and basically handed the nation over to the pro-Japanese group and their descendents. I will also analyze the North Korean case, which succeeded in *ch inilch õngsan* almost completely. Lastly, I will discuss some of the problems produced by the

non-settlement of *ch inilch õngsan*.

2. The Liberation Period and *Ch inilch õngsan*

Fifty-seven years ago, in August, 1945, Chosõn was liberated from Japanese imperial rule. The liberation has two historical significances. First, it meant that the Korean people secured liberation from the direct colonial rule of Imperial Japan. Second, it meant that an opportunity had arrived for the Korean people to build their own new society. However, after liberation, Chosõn was occupied by the US military for 3 years, thus, the Korean people failed to achieve liberation on both counts. Although Koreans achieved the first meaning of liberation after the founding of the Rhee Syngman regime, they never achieved the second meaning of liberation, not to this day. Therefore, 57 years on since liberation, the Korean people are liberated, but it is not genuine.

A further analysis of the characteristics of the liberation period in relation to the two definitions mentioned above is as follows. First, this period saw the creation of a new space of social revolution where new history could be created with a complete break with past history. Second, it was a period of transformation in national history, a crossroads of history so to speak. A critical historical period or transformational period is a period when various historical paths intersect with each other, and taking one particular path will determine the future for a nation for a long time. Third, in this sense, the liberation period is what Perry Anderson called a period of *genesis determinism*. This is to say that *genesis* has more determining power than the current structure and factors contributing to the flow of history. Fourth, in order to be completely disconnected with past history, it is critical that the vestiges of colonialism, which have molded and solidified past history into the present, be dealt with. In other words, *ch inilch õngsan* and the overcoming of the division are the most important tasks.

Nevertheless, in this critical period of liberation, having been detoured from the path toward *ch inilch õngsan*, the correct path, Chosõn society was forced to walk the historical path of division and war by foreign powers. As a result, the redress and punishment of pro-Japanese collaborators, one of the most important national tasks and

the desire of the Korean people, ran aground and remained an intrinsic limitation that constantly hindered the progress of Chosõn history.

3. *Ch inilch õngsan*

1) *Ch inilp à* (pro-Japanese group) - structure and deeds

The pro-Japanese group refers not to natural persons but more to an organization, a group or a person within an organization who has committed pro-Japanese activities. Therefore, *ch inilch õngsan* implies the redress and punishment of pro-Japanese people in certain institutions and the pro-Japanese structure itself. For example, there is the ruling class structure that includes Pak Hũng-shik, a pro-Japanese landowner and comprador capitalist, various committee members and officials belonging to the JGGK like Kim Sõng-su and Choe Kyu-ha, notorious high ranking police officers like Noh Dõk-sul, and cadets of the Imperial Army carrying out the holy war like Park Chung-hee who all have committed anti-national or pro-Japanese deeds. Therefore, the redress of the structure that maintained Japanese colonial rule together with the redress and punishment of those individuals who have voluntarily, not in the sense of coercion, carried out pro-Japanese deeds is demanded.

2) Redress of the Structure

The aim redressing the structure is to liquidate the social, economic, and political structure, laws, and institutions of Chosõn society created and maintained by the Japanese during its 35 years of colonial rule. Such a structure was mostly created not for the good of the Koreans but for the good of Imperial Japan and the convenience of its colonial rule. Therefore, it would have been impossible to build a new Chosõn society for the Koreans without the complete dismantlement of the structure and its institutions from the start. In this sense, there should have been a liquidation of the economic structure of monopoly by Japanese oligarchies and Korean comprador capitalists, a complete removal of the ruling system of the JGGK, including its state organ of oppression with the police at its core, complete reform of colonial anti-national and undemocratic laws and institutions, and the replacement

of national nihilism or defeatism with national pride and sovereignty.

3) Redress and Punishment of Individuals

The redress and punishment of individuals implies bringing justice to the people who have lived off the colonial ruling structure and betrayed the nation by directly or indirectly assisting Japan's domination of Chosŏn. This is more than anything else a creation of a new Chosŏn history by the Koreans themselves and a removal of any possible obstacle to the progress of national history. There are four reasons that make such a task critical. First, it is to restore the national spirit. If the group who committed anti-national deeds by siding with the foreign powers is continually enjoying its power and privilege, no one will be willing to sacrifice for the nation and love for the nation will disappear. The very reason why our society today is virulently pro-American is because we have failed to exact reparation from pro-Japanese collaborators of the liberation period. Second, if left alone such pro-Japanese groups may bring back foreign powers again to reverse the progress of history. Third, whether the complete transformation of the structure for a new Chosŏn society is successful or not, the existence of the pro-Japanese group brings a danger of reviving the old structure. Fourth, if we do not carry out *ch inilch ōngsan*, social justice and the truth of history will be fundamentally infringed.

4) Intrinsic Conditions for *Ch inilch ōngsan*

In the previous section we saw that the liberation period meant first a complete severance from the past history and second, a coming of a social revolution creating a new history. Therefore, the historical condition of the liberation period secured an opportunity for social transformation which could have settled the pro-Japanese issues, and if there had been no intervention from the US military an inevitable social transformation of the entire Chosŏn society to socialism would have been realized. All in all, *ch inilp'a* had to be purged in the process (Kang Jeong-gu, 1990).

As one of the historical structural factors, although the ruling class of Chosŏn was able to share the status of the economic ruling class with the Japanese during the colonial period, they were not permitted to have the role of a political ruling class. As a result, they lost state power

to control society, which stems from the monopoly of violence, after liberation. During the liberation period, 90% of the Korean police have left the force causing a disintegration of the oppressive organ of the state that could maintain the existing social structure. Under such a situation, the traditional ruling class of Chosŏn could no longer occupy the ruling position that they had enjoyed during the colonial period and faced total collapse. Second, since the totally demolished economic base handed down by colonialism was itself a reason for radical social transformation, the condition was set for the disintegration of the existing colonial structure. In other words, where the Japanese owned 93% of the major industrial capital (based on nominal capital) and 18% of farmland, a fundamental change in the ownership or management of these means of production was inevitable with liberation. Under such a condition, it was nearly impossible to maintain or preserve the remnants of the existing colonial and semi-feudal society. Third, the imbalance of class structure, in other words, a working class without capitalists due to the collapse of the Japanese ruling system, the absence of the ruling system of the Korean ruling class, and the flight of the Japanese capitalists created such an imbalance. Therefore, the minute number of Korean capitalists remaining lacked the effective power to control the relatively immense working class. Under such conditions, workers' self-management and the collapse of tenant farming occurred. Fourth, most of the native ruling class such as Korean landowners, capitalists and pro-Japanese bureaucrats lost their legitimacy as a ruling class because of their pro-Japanese past and could not secure their class hegemony. In the condition that the ruling class without hegemony lost their coercive power of the state organ of oppression, a social transformation was inevitable. Fifth, through labor and peasant movements that grew during Japanese colonial rule, the class strength of workers and peasants matured and radicalized. The national liberation and class liberation struggles that emerged out of the labor and peasant movements led by the socialists after 1924 (Kim Keong-il 1992), and the Red peasant union and labor union movements in the 1930s became a historical heritage that provided the basis for the formation of the People's Committees, a spontaneous self-governing organ. If they were given the chance to grow without the intervention of the US military government, the purge of the pro-Japanese group and

national traitors would surely have been carried out in the midst of mass struggle.

Having considered such historical and structural conditions, it would be possible to make a mental construction of a pure liberation period without any foreign intervention. It then can be concluded that Chosŏn society would have realized a structural transformation through a complete eradication of the vestiges of Japanese colonialism and a human transformation through redress and punishment of *ch inilp ǎ*.

4. The US Military Government and *Ch inilch ǒngsan*

1) Failure to Redress the Structure: Structural Alliance With the Colonial Ruling Structure

Immediately after liberation, the US unilaterally forced upon the Korean people a geographical division of Chosŏn into North and South along the 38th parallel. This was to prevent the Soviet Union who was fighting the Japanese forces in the North of Chosŏn from taking control of the entire country and instead, place Chosŏn under the control of the US. Soon after, unlike the Soviet Union who merely occupied the North, the US established direct rule through military government. There was no need for the Soviet Union to intervene directly with its own version of military government. For the Soviet Union, any direct intervention may have brought tension with Koreans since Chosŏn was headed for socialism even under the self-rule of Koreans.

Under the historical situation of the liberation period when about 80% of Koreans wanted socialism whereas only 14% favored capitalism, the US had no choice but to change the path of history which Chosŏn was likely to take by force in order to transplant capitalism in Chosŏn.² Since they needed the material basis for such coercion, the US

2. According a opinion poll taken by the US military government in August, 1946, 14% (1189) of the respondents preferred capitalism while 70% (6037) chose socialism, 7% (574) communism, and 8% (653) said don't know showing 77% of the respondents had a leftist orientation (*Donga Ilbo*, August 13, 1946, cited in Kuksapy ǒnch ǎnwiwonhoe 1973: 104-5).

carried out direct military rule in South Korea. This is why the principle aims of the US military government's occupation policy were to establish anti-communism and introduce capitalism in Chosŏn, and to establish an anti-trusteeship that worked against the agreement of the Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers to establish a provisional government in Chosŏn, which meant that the US would have had to have closed its military government in South Korea and consequently the path to socialism in Chosŏn would have been opened. Lastly, the US military government enforced an anti-revolutionary policy to prevent a radical social revolution that would have demolished the existing ruling structure of colonial and semi-feudal society and brought about socialism in Chosŏn.

In this context, *ch inilch ōngsan* and the intrinsic historical direction toward socialism were serious obstacles for the US occupation of Chosŏn to protect their interests and regional policies. Therefore, the very material basis needed to change the historical path of Chosŏn was direct military rule by the US occupational force in South Korea. However, such a military government is not built in a vacuum but on the existing ruling structure, such as the JGGK, a colonial ruling system. Consequently, the occupational policy of the US military government was to maintain and strengthen the existing ruling structure of Japanese colonialism; the US sought a structural alliance with the old ruling structure. As a result, the redress of structure to get rid of the pro-Japanese structure, laws, and institutions that made up the colonial rule of Chosŏn was thwarted by the violence and coercion of the US military government. In the end, the US has constructed a structure that would make any attempt of redress impossible during the period of US military government.

Therefore, explanations criticising the Rhee Syngman and Hanmindang (Han 'gukminjudang, Korean Democratic Party) regime that assert that proper action would have resulted in *ch inilch ōngsan* lack full understanding that the fundamental structure that led to the impossibility of the redress was the US military government and give full immunity to the US *ex post facto*. In particular, the liberation period was a period of transition for the Korean nation and of *genesis determinism*. In other words, the social structure created during this period would take the role of genesis defining what will come about,

determining the historical path almost permanently. Unfortunately, for the Korean people it was like fastening a button in the wrong hole. Historians must accept the fact that it was not Rhee Syngman who made such mistake but the US.

In examining an historical issue, if one attempts to get at the deepest micro-level in a dualistic way burying oneself into positivistic science that proclaims to be empirical and concrete, there would be no one left to blame in history. This is not to say that micro-level research or historiography of individual's memory or oral history are unimportant. On the contrary, they are very important. However, if they fail to connect with the whole framework, they would disregard the totality or the grand stream of history and fail to identify the direction of history. A methodology of understanding a social phenomenon as part of the totality, and examining individual facts or phenomena in their fundamental contexts is to identify the fundamental relations that define the phenomena from behind the scene and in turn explain the phenomena from such fundamental relations. Such a wholistic methodology — as part of totality, with totality, and connected to totality — is much needed and important for junior scholars of Korean history who are caught up in the popularity of micro-history studies, history of memory, and oral history. I strongly believe the same methodological examination is also required in the studies of *ch inilch ōngsan*.

2) Failure to Redress and Punish Individuals: Personal Alliance With the *Ch inilp'a*

Under General Order No. 1, the US military government with its policy of anti-communism, anti-Soviet Union, anti-revolution, and anti-trusteeship began to mobilize the Japanese, its past enemy, to rescue the colonial ruling system which was at the verge of total destruction by the Korean mass struggles and thereby deter the redress of the pro-Japanese structure. Afterwards, in order to implement its policies the US military government not only strengthened the Japanese colonial ruling system but also began to form an alliance with pro-Japanese Koreans and incorporate them into the power structure.

Generally, the US military government sought alliance with two groups of Koreans. The first group was the landowners and capitalists of the past. This group was composed of direct and indirect pro-

Japanese Koreans.³ The second was the bureaucrats mainly of the colonial police and army. They were mostly direct pro-Japanese. While strengthening the alliance with these two direct and indirect pro-Japanese groups, the US suppressed the radicals and the masses demanding complete redress and purges of the colonial remnants of the pro-Japanese collaborators. This was to transform South Korea into a fortress of anti-communism, anti-Soviet Union, and anti-revolution, and they succeeded in the end.

By allying with the former group, the US intended to maintain the colonial structure and strengthen the colonial order in the liberated Chosŏn society. In addition, through the alliance with the latter group, the US obtained practical tools and means to realize its social aim defined by its alliance with the former group. In other words, the US allied with the former to share its policy aims and with the latter to obtain the means of that policy. Such alliances and co-existence found its habitat in new pro-Americanism born out of the old structure of the *ch inilp 'a*.

Now, I will consider the alliance the US made with the former group. The first occasion of the US alliance was the appointment of the eleven administrative advisors in October 1945, immediately after the US military made a landing at Inch 'n and began its occupation of Chosŏn. The advisors were dominated by the ruling class of the colonial period, composed of one radical and ten conservative members in total contrast to the ideological terrain of Chosŏn society at the time. In fact, among the ten conservatives, six belonged to the pro-Japanese group and the former ruling party Hanmintang.⁴

Such inconsistency in the political reality at the time continued in the Democratic Representative Council created by the US military government with a similar ratio of composition, 45:4, where the ruling

3. The indirect pro-Japanese group refers to people who have not committed pro-Japanese deeds directly but can be considered to had a functional role by association, like Chang T 'aek-sang, whose family was deeply involved in pro-Japanese and anti-national activities. In addition, regardless of their actions, the members of the Hanmintang are categorized as pro-Japanese in the broad sense since the party programme and policies were pro-Japanese in nature.

4. Among the eleven, Cho Man-shik was residing in North Korea and Yŏ Un-hyŏng was labeled as a radical. six were from the Hanmintang, a conservative party with pro-Japanese politics and the other six were Christians (Chin Dŏk-kyu 1980: 49-50).

class of the colonial period prevailed. The conservatives of the colonial ruling class also dominated the Interim Legislative Assembly founded in December 1946. Forty-five seats of the popular representatives were also almost entirely taken by rightists as the election was carried out under the monopoly of the Hanmindang to guarantee the winning of the pro-Japanese Right. For the sake of balance, the other 45 seats of institutional representatives included some moderate and radical individuals, however, at least 50 out of 90 were pro-Japanese rightists.

Such an alliance with the pro-Japanese rightists centered on the Hanmindang became more evident in the US military government's appointment of high ranking officials who had the power to make policies. Among the pro-Japanese Korean high ranking officials appointed in January 1946, the most pro-Japanese were assigned to posts in the state organs of oppression. For example, Inspector General Cho Pyŏng-ok, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Chang T'aek-sang, High Court Justice Kim Yong-mu, Judiciary Director Kim Pyŏng-ro, and Attorney General Yi In were all members of the pro-Japanese political party, Hanmindang. Situations were similar in other branches of the government in that the Hanmindang placed itself as a ruling party of the US military government. Having existed as an economic ruling class during the Japanese colonial period, this pro-Japanese group grew and became strengthened during the US military government period as they became not only an economic but also a political ruling class. As a result, the past pro-Japanese and anti-American group of Japanese colonialism changed its position like a chameleon to become pro-Americanism under the US military government.

The prime example of such an alliance that revived the old pro-Japanese ruling class was the army and police. Not only did the police under the US military government maintain their centralized structure, personnel, laws, and criminal practices of Japanese colonialism in their original forms but also grew to enormous size and power with the military backing of the US. Aside from the main police force, the police had many far right youth organizations like Sŏpukch ōngnyōndan (Sŏpuk Youth Corps), Taedongch ōngnyōndan (Taedong Youth Corps), Yi Pŏm-sŏk ō Chosŏnminjokch ōngnyōndan (Chosŏn National Youth Corps), and Paekūisa (a secret terrorist organization) to carry out its dirty work. In the case of May 10 announcement to establish a separate

government, a para-police organization Hyangbodan, was formed under the leadership of Cho Pyŏng-ok.

About 5,000 colonial policemen were rehired by the US. Just within the high ranking officers alone 80% of them were former Japanese colonial police or army officers, collaborators, traitors, and criminals. They were an important tool for realizing the US policy of anti-communism, anti-Soviet Union, anti-trusteeship, and anti-revolution.

The South Korean Army also was imbued with pro-Japanese to the same extent as the police. The 110 central figures of the Army were composed of graduates of the Military English School. Among them, 87 were formerly of the Japanese Army recommended by Yi Ũng-jun, 21 were from the Manchurian Army recommended by Won Yong-dŏk, and two were from the Chinese Army. Moreover, all the commanders of nine regiments under the US military government were from the Japanese and Manchurian armies. A few from the independence army participated but were systematically excluded or cast out by the US and Rhee Syngman. Later on in the era of Rhee Syngman, these pro-Japanese military officers took refuge in the army during the activities of Panmint ũkwi giving the army a strong tint of being pro-Japanese. For example, there were the police officials like Yun U-kyŏng, Kim Chŏng-ch  e, and Chŏn Pok-tŏk — who later became the commander of the military police and believed to be involved in the assignation of Kim Gu — and the administrative officials like 2nd Ward Head Yi Ik-hong.

As seen so far, the protection and strengthening of the pro-Japanese Koreans and national traitors were attempted and implemented in every aspect of the ruling system and social and personnel structures (Cumings 1981). This US policy to thwart the redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese structure and individuals in Chosŏn was not limited to Chosŏn but was a universal policy of the US applied in all former colonies (Snow 1958). The US occupation policy after World War II was in essence a new version of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere based on a strong alliance with its former enemy, Japan, that treated the peoples of former colonies as second class nations. In this context, any country that was occupied or fell under the influence of the US witnessed the failure of any attempt of *ch inilch ŏngsan*.

Therefore, the Korean historians who argue that *ch inilch ŏngsan*

would have been carried out perfectly if the Koreans of that time had done the right thing while ignoring the ubiquitous context of the US occupation policy is nothing more than self-blame and an unintentional distortion of history giving full immunity to the US. Of course, the Rhee Syngman regime and the people of Korea are also partially responsible, but an explanation that does not expose the structural and original responsibility of the US military government will never be correct.

3) Protection and Strengthening of the *Ch inilp à*

Through alliance and collusion with *ch inilp à* the US military government erected a defense shield deterring *ch inilch òngsan* and, with that shield, set out to implement its occupation policy by directly protecting and strengthening the pro-Japanese group. I will give a few examples of such cases.

In October 1946, a people's struggles erupted in Taegu and the North Kyōngsang region. In response, the US military government recommended Gen. Hodge to form a Chosōn-US joint committee to investigate the incidents. In the report, the chairs — Major General Brown (US), Yō Un-hyōng, and Kim Kyu-shik (Chosōn) — of the joint committee identified the cause to be the police and demanded a cleanup of the police. In other words, it demanded that Police Commissioner Chang T àek-sang and Judiciary Director Cho Pyōng-ok, the major supporters of the pro-Japanese group, be dismissed for recruiting former colonial policemen in large number, continuing the vicious torture practices of Japanese colonialism, carrying out political intervention by the police, and mobilizing right wing youth organizations in police matters. However, the US military government refused to dismiss them and they became more powerful and become the center of the pro-

5. Although Major General Brown, under the command of the US occupation Army commander, participated in the meeting as a representative of the US and agreed with the representatives of Chosōn in full understanding of the situation, it seems he did not have the authority to fulfill the agreement. Moreover, he had no choice but to agree with Yō Un-hyōng and Kim Kyu-shik since he himself reported with concrete evidence on the problems concerning pro-Japanese elements in the police. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude that he was against the political line of the US military government.

Japanese power structure.⁵

Included among the interim agendas stated by the political programme of the interim government adopted by the first meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Commission, there were “ 2) The issue of how to eradicate the vicious consequences of Japanese colonialism and the pro-Japanese elements, and 3) The issue of how to prevent the activities of the reactionary and anti-democratic elements attempting to destroy the interim government. ” Nevertheless, the US military government insisted that the phrase “ the pro-Japanese elements ” in Article 2, and the entire Article 3 be removed. Although such a demand was dismissed by a protest from the Soviet Union, this clearly shows the true intention of the US position on *ch inilch ŏngsan*.

On July 2, 1947, the South Chosŏn Interim Legislative Assembly passed a special law titled “ Special Ordinance for Treating National Traitors, Collaborators, and Profiteers. ” Although it was two years after liberation, it was epoch making legislation to restore the national spirit to carry out the national task. However, it faced strong resistance by many, such as the police. Fearing that the law may target the police with a strong pro-Japanese shade, Cho Pyŏng-ok publicly requested a revision of the article on the regulation of the police while Chongro Police Chief Kim Hyŏng-jin even threatened to use armed force.

On April 20, 1947, the *Minjungshinmun* criticized the legislation of the special law by saying “ Having fallen for a Community Party scheme, even the majority of politicians and political parties of the nationalist camp are talking about a purge of the pro-Japanese group that can lead to a national strife. ” Yi Chong-hyŏng, an infamous secret agent working for the Japanese punitive force in Manchuria, openly protested the punishment of national traitors during the review hearing for the proposal of a law related to the pro-Japanese collaborators on May 5, 1947. The logic was based on anti-communism, determinism, a demand for sacrifice for the creation of the nation, national unity, a lack of talented people, and the fear of national division.

Going against its promise that it would follow the decision of the Legislative Assembly saying that ‘ the problem of pro-Japanese is the problem of the Koreans, ’ the US military government delayed the promulgation of the special law for four months and finally indefinitely suspended the legislation altogether on November 27. As a result, the

redress and punishment of the *ch inilp'a* was ultimately thwarted by the US.

The US military government not only deterred the task of *ch inilch ðngsan* but also succeeded in constructing a structure that made any attempt of redress impossible even after independence, thus, making South Korea the land of the pro-Japanese group. This is to say that the US passed down the legacy of heteronomic history to the Rhee Syngman regime by protecting and strengthening the Japanese colonial ruling system and the pro-Japanese group of national traitors. Such a succession was clearly demonstrated in the May 10 election. The US military government formed a 15 member central election management committee dominated by 13 Hanmindang members. This was a part of an *ex post facto* management of the US to solidify its base even after its withdrawal by firmly planting the pro-Japanese and pro-American Hanmindang and Rhee Syngman's supporters in the newly formed South Korean government.

The May 10 election was by no means an election reflecting the free will of South Koreans but nothing more than a fixed election by the US military government. At the time, the Left and the moderates centered on Kim Kyu-shik, and many rightist social and political organizations centered on Kim Ku refused to participate in the election calling it an election of division. Only the far right camp including Rhee Syngman and his supporters, the pro-Japanese Hanmindang, and terrorist organizations like the North Western Youth Group, and the Great Asia Youth Group participated in the election. Among the 400 or so social and political organizations in South Korea at the time, only 10% of them participated. Therefore, the May 10 election was expected to be a victory for the far rightists even before the election took place (Kang Jeong-gu 1993a).

Kim Ku-shik already foresaw such a problem. As the Speaker of the South Chosŏn Interim Legislative Assembly at the time, he predicted that if the interim government was created by a nation wide general election without a comprehensive reform of the ruling system through which the pro-Japanese group dominated the US military government, the pro-Japanese far right group would win the election and take power. In this context, he clearly expressed his preference for appointing cabinet members instead of a general election proposed by the US

at the second meeting of the US-Soviet Joint Commission.⁶ The Speaker of the National Assembly, Cho So-ang, also expressed in April 1947 that the Rhee Syngman government had no legitimacy. According to him, the political lines founded in the blueprints for the government proposed by the Shanghai Provisional Government, Rhee Syngman, and the US military government are united independent state, sectional independent state, and sectional non-independent local government, respectively (*Kyōnghyang Shinmun*, April 2, 1947).

Despite such problems, the US went ahead with the May 10 election and secured pro-Japanese and pro-American representatives in the National Assembly, which would decide the future of South Korean society, thus securing the continuation of its policy aims. In addition, it succeeded and reproduced the pro-Japanese power base in the executive branch of the South Korean government by bringing all the bureaucrats in its administration into the South Korean government.

As seen so far, through allying with the pro-Japanese structure and individuals and implementing a protection policy, the US consistently carried out its broader policy of making South Korea its bulwark against the Soviet Union and communism no matter what the intrinsic conditions and ideological orientation of South Korea were at the time. With such interests in Northeast Asia, the US restored and reinforced the Japanese colonial structure and promoted the pro-Japanese group. The resulting product was the Rhee Syngman regime. Therefore, expecting the Rhee Syngman regime with its intrinsic limitation to carry out *ch inilch ōngsan* would be futile, like trying to catch a fish in a forest.

5. The Rhee Syngman Regime and *Ch inilch ōngsan*

First, the Rhee Syngman regime, as a continuation of the US military government, pursued the ideologies of US occupation policy, which were being anti-communist, anti-Soviet Union, anti-North

6. Document Files of the US-Soviet Joint Commission, Roll No. 6, "Conversation between Brown and Kim Kyu-shik," June 9, 1947 (quoted in Chung Yong-wook 1995: 198).

Korean, and anti-revolution. Second, it continued the social and ruling structure of Japanese colonialism and maintained the US military government's neo-colonial social structure. Third, the Constituent National Assembly fell under the influence of the pro-Japanese and pro-American far right. Fourth, the pro-Japanese and pro-American far right occupied the highest ranking official posts of the government.⁷ Lastly, the administrative posts were under the control of pro-Japanese bureaucrats.

In light of the material, structural, and personal limitations continued and strengthened by the US military government, the redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese group were destined to fail unless there was a fundamental change in the structure, in other words, a social revolution. Even though the legislation of a law that made the punishing of Korean traitors possible by the younger members of the National Assembly and the activities of Panmintŭkwi, Special Commission for Korean Traitors, were a significant achievement of the struggles attempting to overcome such structural limitations, they were destined to fail.

Nevertheless, under such structural limitations, the activities of Panmint kwi by the younger members of the National Assembly were indeed very significant regardless of its limited success. The National Assembly was dominated by the pro-Japanese far right. This was expected well before the general election because all the left political groups like Kim Ku's Han'gukdokniptang (the Korean Independence Party), Kim Kyu-shik's moderates, and Namnodang (the South Chosŏn Labor Party) refused to participate in the election. It would be also cor-

7. One can easily estimate how dominant the pro-Japanese and pro-American Hanmindang's influence among the majority of administrative officials was through a personal recollection of the first Deputy Minister of Commerce Im Mun-hang. "In the winter of 1945 after liberation, Minister of Home Affairs Shin Ik-mi of the Shanghai provisional government formed an administrative research team upon his return to Korea. The team members were mostly comprised of those who were former officials of the Japanese Government General in Korea. ... After 3 months of research, the team submitted an administrative guideline and was dissolved. However, they were all recruited back to the newly founded government. I became Deputy Minister of Commerce while the lower ranking officials were appointed by the recommendations of the Hanmindang. At the time, the administrative officials were under the influence of the Hanmindang. Even the provisional government leaders felt that it was necessary to utilize the colonial officials to run the new government" (quoted in Kil Chin-hyŏn 1984: 181).

rect to assume that most of the 85 independent representatives belonged to the far right camp.

Of the 85 independent representatives, the majority were formerly members of the Hanmindang and other pro-Japanese far right organizations who ran as independents when they failed to get party nominations or wanted to evade the people's negative evaluation of the pro-Japanese Hanmindang, which was, in essence, the ruling party under the US military government. Others belonged to the so called 'negotiators' who demanded negotiations between North and South, such as the Handoktang. They also decided to run as independents when their affiliated organizations decided not to participate in the election. Therefore, it would be difficult to consider the independent representatives as progressive or moderates as were the negotiation faction. Instead, they were part of the far right divisionist faction (Kang Jeong-gu 1993a).

What is interesting is that despite the far rightist class orientation of the National Assembly representing the interests of the landowners and capitalists, the new Constitution included an article stipulating "a special law shall be enacted to punish diabolic anti-national deeds" and the very special law on the punishment of Korean traitors with 103 votes in favor out of 141. This was possible even though the Korean traitors law encroached upon the foundation of the ruling class because there existed a pan-national demand for the redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese group. Other factors included the existence of a few progressive independent representatives centered on S nginhoe and Tonginhoe, the low tendency of party voting, the strong pressure from civil society, and the flexible and loose activities of young representatives.

After surviving the test of the National Assembly, the Panmint kwi faced yet more resistance, this time much more systematic, from the executive branch headed by Rhee Syngman. Of course, such systematic resistance was covered with familiar logic mentioned above like anti-communism, national unity, etc. The following excerpt from a leaflet distributed in the National Assembly during the review of the Korean traitors law reveals such logic very clearly.

The President is a nation's divinity. Obey him absolutely.

Anyone arguing for the purge of fellow nationals is a communist. The National Assembly must not be deceived and must drive out infiltrators. All Koreans must unify now (Kim Chin-hak and Han Ch ōl-yōng 1954: 118).

Another example includes a slogan shouted at the inauguration ceremony of the Korean government and an anti-communist rally organized by Yi Chong-hyōng which said, “ The act of communist spies in the National Assembly is creating national division, ” and continues, “ consider anyone who supports the Republic of Korea as a patriot and befriend him or her regardless of his or her actions before August 15, ” and in its open statement to the president criticized the special law as being “ the root of civil strife caused by the extreme application of a retrospective law that completely disregards the purge of communist traitors, the real criminals of national treason. ” A presidential statement on February 15 called for the suspension of the special law if it conflicted with public security. Also, Kim Chun-yōn of the Hanmindang stated on August 2, 1948, that “ due to the lack of talented people, an extreme exclusion must be seriously reconsidered. ”

Using such logic the pro-Japanese group resisted systematically and structurally. Their organizational resistance included repeated presidential statements (“ We cannot divide the people with such a problem. ... It is nothing but trouble. ... We must concentrate on recovering the fallen credibility of the regime. ...), the president ’ s call for the release of Roh Tōk-sul, the attempt to reverse the Korean traitors law at a Ministerial Meeting, the appointment of prominent pro-Japanese Yu Chin-o as a member of the investigation committee for the government, the constitutional complaint by the government on the constitutionality of the anti-national deeds law, the threatening of Kim Sang-dōk, chairman of the Panmintūkwi, the assassination attempts to kill members of the Panmintūkwi by high ranking police officials through Paek Min-t ’ae, a governmental demonstration of the Association for National Enlightenment conspired by the police, the February 15 Special Presidential Statement, the government ’ s proposal to reform of the law, a motion to dismiss Rep. Kim Sang-don, and the June 6 police assault on the Panmintūkwi.

The two most influential events that led to the dissolution of the

Panmintŭkwi are the June 6 police assault and the National Assembly spy case. It is important to keep in mind the critical role of the US or pro-Americanism. The police assault was ordered when President Rhee Syngman heard a report from the ambassador to the US Chang Myŏn that Welch from the American Methodist Church protested the arrest of Rev. Yang Chu-sam who was accused of being an anti-nationalist by the Panmintŭkwi. President Rhee immediately ordered Minister of Home Affairs Kim Hyo-sŏk to dissolve the Panmint kwi.

The National Assembly spy case has a strong possibility of being a fabricated case. It came about when young representatives vehemently protested the Korea-US economic agreement which accepted the US's demand of any property in South Korea calling it a neo-colonial infringement on their sovereignty and proposed ' a resolution on Peace and Reunification of the North and South, ' which called for the withdrawal of the US troops and emphasized autonomy from the US. Ultimately, the Panmint kwi was dissolved as the progressive young representatives were eliminated through the so called the South Korean Labor Party spy case and the Korean traitors law never went into effect. With this, the task of purging the pro-Japanese group was completely deterred.

With structural limitations such as the legacy of the US military government, pan national and class struggles by young representatives in the National Assembly utterly failed. Although these young representatives were able to overcome the structural limitations within in the boundary of state organs and the legislative assembly, they failed to overcome the structural limitations represented by the executive branch and other institutions of civil society. Such structural limitations were never an intrinsic feature of Chosŏn society or an inherent characteristic of the Rhee Syngman regime in the liberation period. Instead, they were created by the US and its neo-imperialist expansionary occupation policy imposed upon the Korean nation.

6. North Korea and *Ch inilch ōngsan*

Ch inilch ōngsan in North Korea is in striking contrast to that of South Korea. This is because in North Korea, the core of the ruling

power was composed of active participants of anti-Japanese national liberation struggle who were able to eliminate any chance of pro-Japanese or pro-foreign power groups emerging again.

1) The Redress and Punishment of Individuals

Quite unlike South Korea, the North Korean redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese individuals began immediately after the founding of North Chosŏn Provisional People's Committee in February 1946. The US revived the collapsing Japanese army in Korea under MacArthur's order to maintain law and order and kept the JGGK intact. Although the JGGK was soon disintegrated due to strong criticisms from home and abroad, its high ranking officials became advisors to the US military government and continued to play an influential role in the domination of Korea. In other words, as with other East Asian countries, the US implemented a reactionary occupation policy to deter *ch'inilch'ŏngsan* from the beginning.

In contrast, the Soviet Union took *ch'inilch'ŏngsan* as its immediate task from the beginning and also played the role of catalyst. The Soviet Union's commitment was clearly shown in the general policy statement announced by Gen. Ivan M. Chistiakov, the commander of the Soviet Union occupation army. As a result, the first wave of the redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese collaborators was carried out before the formation of the North Chosŏn Provisional People's Committee by local people's committees, which were spontaneously formed radical organizations. Most prominent officials of the JGGK, of police, and of bureaucracy and pro-Japanese intellectuals were removed from posts or escaped to the South. The more earnest and systematic redress began with the establishment of the Provisional People's Committee.

Following the announcement of the resolution on eleven urgent tasks facing the Provisional People's Committee on February 8, 1946, the 20 articles of the political programme announced by the Provisional People's Committee before the meeting of joint US-Soviet Union commission on March 23, 1946, drew out a plan for *ch'inilch'ŏngsan* and implemented it. The leading force behind the *ch'inilch'ŏngsan* initiative was Kim Il-sung, chairman of the Provisional People's Committee and other radical nationalists of the armed anti-Japanese struggle. For

example:

Article 1: Completely purge the pro-Japanese and anti-nationalist traitors ...

Article 2: Immediately nationalize the lands taken by the Japanese invaders and pro-Japanese traitors ... (11 urgent tasks).

Article 1: The past remnants of Japanese colonial rule must be completely driven out from political and economical life of Chosŏn.

Article 7: Abolish Japanese colonial laws and judiciary institutions used during the colonial rule.

Article 9: Confiscate all lands from big landowners, traitors, and Japanese (20 Articles of the political programme).

As a result, the North Korean redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese was completed one year after liberation. In fact, evidence of such a complete purge of the pro-Japanese remnants by North Korea is shown by the individual composition of the leaders of the North Korean Labor Party, the main political force governing North Korea. From the report of the review committee on 801 representatives to the inaugural conference of the North Korean Labor Party, we can see how the individual composition of the Labor Party excluded the pro-Japanese group and concentrated on anti-Japanese national liberation activists.

Among the comrades arrested by the Japanese before August 15, 1945: Imprisoned were 291 (36%); those who served 1-5 years of hard labor were 149 (18%); those who served 6-10 years were 71 (7%), and those who served more than 10 years were 26 (3%). The longest was 18 years served by one person. The total number of people imprisoned was 263 and their total years of imprisonment was 1,087 years. ... The number of comrades who were involved in the anti-Japanese struggle, the underground movement, armed rebellion, or who were exiled was 427 (53%) (Kuk-t'ŏt ŏngilwon 1988: 20).

According to Pak Il-u's report quoted above, the number of party representatives who were imprisoned or involved in overseas anti-

Japanese revolution was 718, 89.6% of the total. Such a statistic shows that the purge of pro-Japanese individuals and the destruction of their power base in North Korea was carried out almost completely.

The process of redress was completed with the disenfranchisement of the pro-Japanese by banning them from provincial, city, and district wide elections of people 's committee representatives to fundamentally eliminate any chance for them to exercise their political power in the new Chosŏn society. At the time, the pro-Japanese to be purged only included the most zealous pro-Japanese such as those listed below. Furthermore, the purge was further scrutinized when a review of qualification of the candidates of the general election of the Peoples ' Committee to form a legal sovereign government was carried out. Other minor pro-Japanese offenders were dealt with in rehabilitation programs. In the end, almost a half of the class composition of the representatives of the People 's Supreme Council was from the ordinary masses, 22% peasants and 26% workers, giving the regime the characteristic of a mass-oriented regime.

Redress was made against the following:

1. Entire central members and advisors of the Japanese Government General in Korea
2. Entire members of provincial and regional assemblies
3. Entire people who worked for the Japanese Government General in Korea and provincial assemblies
4. Entire heads of Japanese colonial police, the prosecutor 's office, and courts
5. People who voluntarily or knowing aided Japan through arms production and economic support
6. Leaders of pro-Japanese organizations who have zealously supported Japanese colonialism

2) The Redress of the Structure

The transformation of the structure left by Japanese colonial rule — laws, institutions, customs, etc. that existed for Japan affecting economical, social, and political spheres of Chosŏn society — began with the 20 articles of the political programme. As mentioned above, it stipulated that “ The past remnants of Japanese colonial rule must be

completely driven out, ”and that they must“ Abolish Japanese colonial laws and judiciary institutions used during the colonial rule. ”

Following such policies, the eradication of the Japanese colonial structure started with land reforms. According to Article 2 of the Land Reform Order, the lands to be confiscated were the “ lands owned by the Japanese state, organizations, and individuals, traitors, and others who collaborated with the colonial regime. ” In addition, North Korea nationalized major industries formerly owned by Japanese or national traitors to dismantle the material infrastructure of the *ch inilp à*. The ‘ order related to the nationalization of industry, transportation, postal office and banks ’ promulgated on August 10, 1946, gave a legal basis for the redress of the structure by prescribing “ all companies, mines, power plants, railroads, roads, postal offices, banks, commercial and cultural properties owned by the Japanese state, companies or individuals and by those who betrayed the Korean people shall be confiscated without compensation and shall belong to the Korean people, in other words, nationalized. ”

Dealing with the pro-Japanese structure began with the land reforms in February 1946 and continued with the nationalization of major industries, reforms of laws and institutions such as the labor law and gender equality law, and with the general mobilization movement to eradicate national nihilism or defeatism and to promote national pride and identity, all culminating in the process of anti-imperial and anti-feudal democratic reform. As a result, North Korea succeeded in making a transition from the social system of a semi-feudal colonial society ruled by Japanese imperialists to a people ’ s economic system containing a mixture of socialism, capitalism and a small commodity mode of production, almost completely eradicating the pro-Japanese social and economical structure and remnants.

3) Historical Significance of the North Korean *Ch inilch õngsan*

As seen so far, North Korea established Chosõn society after almost completely carrying out the most important task of the liberation period, the redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese individuals and structure. The personnel and material bases for such a task were in place with the start of the Provisional People ’ s Committee in early 1947. Moreover, North Korea went on to installing a mechanism that

would make sure no pro-Japanese or pro-foreign forces would ever return. What this means is that by completing the most important national task at hand, the transition of North Korean society naturally moved to establishing national law and order and placing national sovereignty as its highest social value.

In contrast, South Korea walked the path of anti-nationalism as *ch'inilch'ŏngsan* never took place, thus, the pro-Japanese group gained more power and members actually grew in number, more even than in the colonial period. As a result, it is an embarrassment that only now, 57 years later, that a few representatives of the National Assembly at their personal discretion and not with their official title have announced a pro-Japanese group list. In addition, mainstream South Korean society insists on 'Korea-US cooperation first' over and above national cooperation, while the nation-state is crippled as its authority to command the military in time of war has been deprived of by the US for more than 50 years.

Here, two aspects of the North Korean redress are worth noting. First, was the role played by the Soviet Union occupation army. As shown in its general policy statement, the role of the Soviet Union occupation army was immense. Specifically, unlike the US, it immediately transferred the administrative and law enforcement powers to the people's committee, indigenous spontaneous state organs, and disarmed the Japanese army. Second, it strengthened the indigenous revolutionary forces and completely prevented any intervention or anti-revolutionary acts by the Japanese in the mass struggle for anti-imperial and anti-feudal revolution. Third, it presented the eradication of all remnants of Japanese colonialism as the first priority in its occupation policy, as agreed in the Moscow conference. Fourth, it approved and supported spontaneous organs like the people's committee exercising sovereignty, such as administrative and ruling powers to allow the Koreans to create their own history.⁸ In conclusion, the role of the

8. The support and assistance of the Soviet Union occupation army took the form of advisor. However, if the North Korean government were capitalist and not socialist, the Soviet Union would have attempted to establish direct rule through a military government as in the cases of Eastern Europe.

Soviet Union occupation army in the North Korean redress of the pro-Japanese was not an independent variable, rather it was a stimulant or catalyst.

The second significance is that North Korea did not stop at simply redressing the pro-Japanese issues but succeeded in transforming the anti-Japanese nationalists into the ruling elite of North Korea. Also established was an educational institution, the Mangyŏng Graduate School, to nurture national spirit to prevent any possibility of pro-Japanese or toadyism regenerating in society. Founded in the fall of 1947, Mangyŏng Graduate School was an elite school aimed to honor and recognize in various ways those who sacrificed their lives for national independence and their decedents to establish national pride and spirit. Not only socialists but also the sons of nationalists, such as the son of a rich man from Manchuria who financially supported the independent fighters, were admitted to the school. Offers of admission were even given to the children of patriots in South Korea. The graduates of this elite school now make up the core of the ruling class in North Korea and, it was, perhaps, the education gained in the Mangyŏng Graduate School that has instilled strong national pride and spirit into their minds to the extent that there has been no power struggle among the upper elites, even during the mid 1990s when North Korea faced the most extreme conditions called the 'march of suffering.' Indeed, the redress of the pro-Japanese and the cultivation and succession of national pride and spirit in the history of North Korea may have provided the basis for which the North Korea regime could withstand its current difficulties and crises.

7. The Failure of *Ch inilch ŏngsan* and Obstruction of the Nation's Future

Even though *ch inilch ŏngsan* was the most important national task of the liberation period, despite the intrinsic conditions of Chosŏn society to carry it out, it was thwarted from the beginning by the US. Its historical consequence did not disappear but remains to this day deeply affecting every sphere of our society and generating distortions. Therefore, even in the era of imminent reunification, there are plenty of

obstacles blocking the future of the Korean nation toward peace and reunification. Such obstructions of the nation's future are many. However, I will deal only with the three most representative cases, intellectual toadyism, the forgotten issue of redressing past injustices, and obstructions in the path toward an era of imminent reunification.

The university community, the sanctuary of learning, failed completely to carry out the purge of pro-Japanese individuals. Moreover, the pro-Japanese group have filled the posts of university chancellors and destroyed in essence the foundation of national and sovereign learning. The university is an institution that plays an important role of reproducing the ruling ideology of a society and provides the direction of history that society must follow. However, since such important institutions were the stronghold of the pro-Japanese group, one can easily guess the negative impact the failure of *ch inilch ōngsan* had in Korean society.

In closely examining the relationship between the pro-Japanese group and the university chancellors, one can easily understand why Korean academia became so submersed in intellectual toadyism. In the case of Seoul National University, the first Korean chancellor, Yi Ch'un-ho, was a member of the Kyōngsōng Christian Coalition that led the campaign calling Koreans to become the subjects of the Japanese Emperor. Korea University Chancellor, Yu Chin-o, often called the father of Korea University, served as an officer of the Chosōnmuninbogukhoe (Society of Patriotic Writers) and wrote, on many occasions, justifying the Japanese invasion as a war of justice while demonizing the US. Despite their anti-national deeds, they became the leaders of Korean society.

The first Yonsei University Chancellor, Paek Nak-jun, was a typical opportunist who became pro-Japanese and anti-American from being pro-American, than changing to become extreme pro-American. He even praised pro-Japanese individuals like Yu Ōk-kyōm as patriots and served as a member of the review committee of independent fighters. His career became a common pattern for many pro-Japanese Koreans who transformed themselves as independent fighters and gained power after liberation instead of repenting their past pro-Japanese deeds. The pro-Japanese career of the Ewha Woman's University Chancellor, Kim Hwal-ran, is a well known case. However, she went on

to be a representative at the UN General Assembly, the Minister of Public Information, a circuit ambassador, on the board of directors of the Anti-Communist League of Asia, and became the godmother of the South Korean Women 's Society.

Aside from these four universities, university founders like Yi Suk-jong of Sungshin Women 's University, Song Kũm-sõn of Tõksõng Women 's University, Pae Sang-myõng of Sangmyung Women 's University, Ko Hwang-gyõng of Seoul Women 's University, and Im Yõng-shin of Chungang Univerity all joined pro-Japanese organizations like Chosõnimjõnboguktan and became the leaders from within the pro-Japanese group. In light of this, it would not be difficult to understand that the universities under their control were very pro-Japanese. When the National Assembly included them as pro-Japanese in the March 1 statement this year, some protested saying they should not be labelled as pro-Japanese since they contributed greatly to nation building. No matter how great the contribution may be, pro-Japanese activities will always be pro-Japanese activities. More important, they make up the core of far right ideologues of the division in South Korean society and played the role of being the biggest obstacle to national reconciliation and peaceful reunification.

Another obstruction is the forgotten case of redressing the past injustices. Contemporary Korean history is a history of continued dictatorships and division such as Cold War dictatorship and developmental dictatorship and of the mass struggles of the oppressed civilians. As a result, there arose the imperative to redress the past injustices. However, the reality of Korean society is that such demands for redress have disappeared and instead, only the campaigns to revive Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee are talked about.

The redress of the past injustices has been abducted by Rhee Syngman who argued " Obsession with the past will only hinder us in the future " Kim Young-sam also said " We cannot let our unfortunate past history be an obstacle to our progress. Therefore, I have not changed my mind in letting history decide, " Kim Dae-jung became the honorary president of the organization and initiated the construction of a memorial hall for Park Chung-hee, and other pro-Japanese Koreans and their descendents. I cannot help but to ask whether this would have been possible if there had been proper *ch inilch õngsan* during

the liberation period? Would such phenomena that go against the current of history be possible? They were possible because of *genesis determinism* that comes from the failure of *ch inilch ðngsan*. In order to prevent a second or third Park Chung-hee or Chun Doo-hwan, there must be proper redress and punishment of the pro-Japanese group.

Lastly, there are obstructions in the path toward the era of reunification. With the June 15 South-North Joint Declaration often referred to as the great leap forward in Korean history, Korea has entered the era of imminent reunification. However, this grand current of Korean national history to overcome the division imposed by foreign powers and achieve peace and reunification has been brought to a halt by the Bush administration in the US. Armed with new barbaric imperialism the Bush administration is escalating military tension on the Korean peninsula to the brink of war with his ' Axis of Evil ' drive and it is now the major hindrance to Korea 's peace and reunification.

Such obstructions in Korea 's future are not limited to foreign powers like the US but also come from within. They are the Cold War conservatives with historical roots in the pro-Japanese group of the liberation period. At the beginning of 2001, Foreign Minister Yi Chõng-pin said " the South Korean media runs to the east if the American media goes east, and runs to the west if America goes to west. "The reactions of the political groups centered on the media and the minority parties on the Korea-US Summit of the same year have clearly shown us their Cold War mentality and toadyism. On such obstruction from within, Kim Min-ung, a political commentator, writes:

Led by Lee Hoi-chang, the *Chosun Ilbo* most domestic newspapers, and the opposition party, accused the Kim Dae-jung government of creating a diplomatic blunder by not going along with the US but protesting and criticizing the US 's hegemonic intervention into domestic affairs. To what country do these newspapers, political groups, and political leaders belong? (Kim Min-ung 2001).

As such, these pro-American conservative forces are blindly following the Bush administration 's attempt to hinder the future of our nation. They are echoing the words of the US 's barbaric and Cold War

style North Korean policies like parrots and going so far as religious fanaticism in worshipping the US by placing South Korea-US cooperation ahead of North-South cooperation. Mainstream newspapers like the Chosun Ilbo and the Donga Ilbo and political forces such as the Grand National Party being rooted in pro-Japanese are going all out to nullify the June 15 Joint Declaration and push back the North-South relations by conspiring with the Cold War regionalism of Kyõngsang Province.

They are truly anti-communists and anti-North and genuine pro-American toadies who led the witch hunt at the forefront of the Cold War. Rep. Kim Won-ung scolded such pro-Americanism saying " It is difficult for me to tell whether the nationality of the conservatives of our nation is South Korean or American.

From today's historical perspective, as the Koreans are about to welcome the era of reunification, the call for the civic and social organizations to rigorously carry out the so called ' second *ch inilp ach õngsan* to get onto the right path toward the future of the nation and forge ahead is stronger than ever.

Ch inilp a kunsang, published in 1948, declares " regardless of the seriousness of the criminal deed [pro-Japanese and anti-national act] is, there is no individual in this world who has the right to forgive. This is because its harm affects not individuals but the entire Chosõn nation and the justice of humanity. For this, we must denounce it impartially. " Many have argued, " in order to prevent the tragic history becoming a fetter chaining down the progress, there must be complete prosecution of those who are responsible for the tragic history. "Indeed! In order for the Korean nation to forge ahead in progress and to make a new future, Koreans have the duty and responsibility to belatedly redress and punish the pro-Japanese collaborators, at least at the level of history.

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