

Leaflets, and the Nature of the Korean War as Psychological Warfare

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As it was interconnected with the Cold War situation on a global scale, the Korean War gave us one of the most vivid demonstrations of clashes between ideologies in recent history. Naturally in a war of such a nature, the opponents not only used armies and weapons. They resorted to psychological warfare and tactics utilizing propaganda as well. Literally, the combatants made up images and spread them.

In this research, the leaflets deployed and distributed by the UN forces, the North Korean Army, and the Chinese communist forces are mainly examined. Although the research concentrates slightly more on the US army's tactics of psychological warfare, the primary objective for this research is to determine what kind of "Images of War" were produced, and what the mindsets behind such creations were. By conducting such research, we are able to identify the official ideologies that the combatants wanted to force the general public to accept. We are also able to figure out how such images and ideologies were accepted and processed in the general public's mind. And in the end, we should be able to determine how people with war experiences came to possess and maintain memories regarding certain events that happened during the war.

Leaflets were distinctively important methods used in psychological warfare. The US army distributed more than 2.5 billion leaflets by the time the truce was signed. Those leaflets were designed to provide personal incentives to the recipients or to persuade them to have second thoughts about their situation in terms of ideological preference. The former included examples of surrender passes or suggestions of good treatment to potential prisoners of war. The latter contained stories with themes such as the supposed harsh treatment of the public committed by Communist regimes, or criticism against North Korea and China for being the so-called "Puppet regimes" of Soviet Russia.

The theory of a fake, "pseudo-Kim Il Sung" is a typical form of the latter. This theory was created during the time period when the US army set up a military government in Korea and was spread during the Korean War by US Army's Far East Command. The US also started to depict China as a puppet of the USSR after the communization of China. The Secretary of State Department Dean Rusk openly said on May 1951 that the People's Republic of China was merely a "Slavic Manchukuo." The fact that a theory of this nature was included even in the report of the Far East Command strongly suggests that the US army was in political need of the image of Kim Il Sung being nothing but a fake figure. This image, and the intentions surrounding its creation, clearly demonstrates a Cold War mentality, and we can see that US had to maintain that image because of its own political and

economical interests.

Many American social scientists, especially the behavioral scientists, contributed to the US army's creation of a "Cold War Enemy." These people served as consultants for the US army and played an instrumental role in applying psychological warfare tactics based on behavioral science developed from World War II to the Korean War that in turn provided the American community of social scientists with the very first opportunity to study communist society firsthand. American social scientists studied North Korean society through the Sovietization theory, and created images of NK based on that theory.

The Korean War is mostly remembered for its ideological warfare. As the war progressed, the inherent ideological and international nature of the war became more and more apparent, and in the end ideological propaganda became a more important issue than any other thing, even the outcome of the actual war. The Korean War served as a battlefield international in scale and required that combatants play psychological warfare for their survival. This led to the enforcement of anti-communist sentimentality within Korean society, and this hatched numerous political images.

Key Words: Korean War, psychological warfare, leaflet, cold war ideology, theory of puppet, anti-communism, Sovietology, and behavioralism.

Preface

History is, put in other words, a memory shared by a certain community or even an entire society regarding their own past. History is also, all about keeping, preserving and managing those memories. Yet, such memories that are respectively possessed by each person, or each society, tends to fragmentize and deteriorate as time passes even when it is hoped that they remain intact and coherent. As a result, perceptions toward history or historical memories usually tend to exist in the form of fragmented memories conglomerated with certain images. And in the process of forming, managing and preserving such perceptions, political power intervenes. Certain memories are officially confirmed and authorized by the government, while other memories are left to be remembered only as private information, or downright suppressed and negated by the same government. For example, the matter of examining what really happened in the struggle of the April 3rd uprising of Jeju Island, or restoring the rights and honors of the victims of that incident is still in a controversial state to say the least, and we can still see today the tensions among factions either past or present that would like to admit or deny certain memories to a certain extent.

People of South Korea and the people of North Korea remember the Korean War in a very different fashion. The South Korean way of officially remember-

ing the Korean War, which we can call the South Korean “Official Memory of the War,” is to remember the war as a conflict initially started by North Korean “puppets” illegal, sneak and blatant act of aggression against the South. On the other hand, the North Korean way of officially remembering the war is to remember the war as a perfectly justified, righteous National Liberation effort.

Other countries also have some interesting views upon the Korean War themselves. The American official memory of the war is certainly well mirrored in their depiction of soldiers dispatched to the war zone as freedom fighters on a crusade battling the illegal invasion on the South committed by the puppet regime of North Korea. Yet to the U.S. general public, the Korean War is a war simply forgotten, or unknown to most of citizens, although there are certain ongoing events including erecting official monuments and bronze statues to the memory of the war in Washington D.C. These events show recent efforts of the U.S. government to promote the memory of the Korean War at the level of state ritual. On the other hand, Chinese people remember the war as an encouraging example of cooperation between the Chinese and North Korean people.

These several and also distinctly different kinds of memories certainly clash with each other, and such clashes among certain parties that are determined to gain a dominant position in terms of being recognized most widely by the public and most officially by the authorities seem to be the real driving force behind all the debates and controversies regarding issues like evaluating the nature of the Korean War. Ordinary persons’ memories of the Korean War usually comprise of certain selective memories related to the surviving “official” memory. And such are either reinforced or diminished under the influence of certain ideologies or cultural interactions that are generated by such official memories, ideologies and interactions that we happen to meet everyday.

Being interconnected with the global scale of the Cold War situation at the time, the Korean War gave us one of the most vivid demonstrations of clashes between ideologies in recent history. In a war with such nature, the opponents did not use mere armies and weapons. They heavily resorted to psychological warfare and tactics utilizing propaganda as well. Literally, the combatants made up images suiting their own political interests, and spread them as they saw fit. As a result, during the Korean War, memories were created, processed, unleashed and eventually clashed with each other, with such proceedings being carefully staged by the creators of those memories from the start. In this research, the leaflets distributed by the U.S. forces, the North Korean Army, and the Chinese Communist forces are mainly examined in order to determine what

kind of “War Images” were intended to be established, and what the mind-sets behind such creations were. By conducting such research, we will be able to identify the official ideologies that the combatants wanted to force the general public to accept and will also be able to figure out how such images and ideologies were accepted and processed in the general public’s mind. In the end, we should be able to determine how people with war experiences got to possess and maintain memories regarding certain events that happened during the war. Leaflets from every side are examined in this research, yet the research itself would also concentrate slightly more upon the contents of leaflets distributed by U.S. forces, and moreover the U.S. Army’s tactics of psychological warfare.

There is not so much research dedicated to the theme of psychological warfare’s importance during the Korean War, except some observing notes or comments provided by soldiers or researchers who were involved in psychological operations conducted by the U.S. forces. The very first book in this field was authored by Stephen E. Pease who was involved in such warfare. His book did not provide any basic data for his assessments, but certainly is the first work which introduced us to psychological warfare crafted by U.S. forces during the Korean War nonetheless (Pease 1992). On the other hand, Alan K. Abner, who participated in such warfare as a member of the U.S. Air force, showed us in his book how the soldiers in the “War of Words” were recruited, trained and instructed to carry out their missions (Abner 2000). This book revealed that the psychological warfare of the U.S. army was in fact not aimed at North Korean troops in the field, but at the real enemy, the Soviet Union, meaning that this kind of warfare served as an important tool used by the U.S.’ in dealing with the Cold War situation.

Aside from these works, John W. Riley and Leonard S. Cottrell’s work is also consultable. They were American social scientists who participated as consultants to U.S. psychological warfare and worked on analyzing the effects of such warfare (*Public Opinion Quarterly* 1951; Riley 1957). Their work is currently only partially introduced to us. These studies and research are not sufficient to understand U.S. psychological warfare or warfare involving leaflet distribution in a direct fashion, but nonetheless are very useful in the sense that they are providing us with studies or analyses from persons who were actually involved in such a task. Their works were published as analysis reports by various institutes such as the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University, the Human Resources Research Institute at Air University, or the Rand Corporation, institutes that were all funded by the U.S. government and

U.S. forces. These reports were duly consulted in this author's studies.

Recent studies in the U.S. focusing upon the Cold War mentality and culture might prove useful in our efforts to determine the nature of U.S. psychological warfare as well. Ron Robin's book is not a book dedicated to such warfare, and could rather be categorized under the field of American Intellectual history studying the events of the 1950s. But his unique methods and analyses offer us many insights regarding the relationship between the society of social scientists and psychological warfare, and the epistemological background of such warfare. He analyzed how the behavioral sciences and their methods, which were at the center of heavy academical interest among American social scientists during the 1950s, were studied at several academical institutes and scholars hired or recruited by the U.S. government and the U.S. army and applied to actual psychological operations. He analyzed how Behavioral scientists served in creating a "Cold War enemy," and he tried to determine the inner structure of the so-called Government-Military-Academy Complex (Robin 2001).

Another work recently announced by Charles Armstrong provides us with some background information of the psychological warfare aspect of the Korean War by analyzing all the political propoganda made by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the time period 1945~1950 in both the southern and northern parts of the Korean peninsula. He evaluated them as part of the cultural cold war that was going on between those two entities (Armstrong 2003).

The Characteristics of U.S. Army Leaflets—Types and Contents

Leaflets were the most prominent method in terms of psychological warfare tactics used in the Korean War. Although the U.S. forces issued propoganda through loudspeakers or radio broadcasting as well, loudspeakers were limited to usage only at the tactical level of psychological engagement, while radio broadcasting was simply of very little use as the primary targets who should be listening to the broadcast such as North Korean People's Army (NKPA), the Chinese People's Volunteers Army (CPVA), and North Korean civilians were not equipped with radio receivers (General Headquarters 1951). On the other hand, leaflets were very important and also extremely useful for the war effort. Frank Pace, who was the secretary of the U.S. Department of the Army during the Korean War, produced the order to literally "bury the enemy in paper" (Pease 1992). In fact, the U.S. army distributed over 2.5 billion leaflets over the

enemy and their rear areas from the beginning of the war. Considering that the number of NKPA and CPVA soldiers who participated in the Korean War roughly estimated to have been two million, the sheer amount of leaflets suggest that at least one leaflet per day would have been found by every single soldier everyday on the field during the entire war. With 2.5 billion leaflets, the entire Korean peninsula should have been covered with no less than twenty layers (Pang 2000: ii).

The North Korean authorities, the NKPA, and CPVA, provided the North Korean public with information regarding the war through the Pyeongyang Broadcast system and other several newspapers. At the same time, the North Korean Worker's Party, the Chinese Communist Party, along with the NKPA and CPVA were all equipped with a well-organized system for propaganda and agitation purposes. North Korea and China also used radio broadcasts in their war efforts, but like the U.S., rather heavily depended on tools like leaflets in the end. The leaflet was a major method of political propaganda, and its usefulness was certainly appreciated.

During the Korean War, the Far East Command of the U.S. Army stationed in Tokyo supervised all proceedings involving leaflets distributed by U.S. and Korean troops. The leaflets examined here in this research show a total of 193 types, and the main themes and subjects of such leaflets included the suggestion of surrender, manipulating their minds to provoke a loss in their morale or urge to fight, and provided political, ideological and moral assaults upon the enemy's conscience, etc.¹

Seventy-four types contained contents designed to appeal to the receivers' personal interest, 62 of them were resorting to political and ideological attacks upon the receivers' mind, and 57 of them were dedicated to propaganda, agitation and provided public information to civilians. The U.S. army not only issued such leaflets to enemy troops, but also to the general public, showing a different approach from the leaflet warfare conducted by NKPA or CPVA. Leaflets dis-

1. This research analyzed the leaflets collected by Pang Sun Joo in his aforementioned work. Among those leaflets, the ones distributed by U.S. troops are archived at the MacArthur Memorial Library & Archives and the U.S. Army Military History Institute. The ones distributed by the North Korean and Chinese troops were released from classified status by Pang Sun Joo from the <Seized Documents from NKPA during the Korean War> section at the National Archives of U.S.. Considering the nature of the archives in which the leaflets were in custody, we can assume that these leaflets do feature the general quality that was shared by the leaflets distributed during the Korean War.

Table 1. Themes contained in leaflets distributed by the U.S. army

Subjects	Messages
Related to Personal Interest (74 cases)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encouraging enemy soldiers to defect or surrender (39) - Suggesting that they should run away, leading them to give up their intention to fight, elevating their sense of defeat (19) - Leading them to feel home-sickness, emphasizing the destruction of families due to the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party’s offenses (16)
Political and Ideological Content (62 cases)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “China and North Korea are the puppets of the U.S.S.R.” (10) - Bad things on the Communist Monarchy and the Communist Party’s harsh treatment of the public (13), the Communist party’s exploitation and looting of public and private properties (3) - “The Chinese Army are invaders and oppressors” (5), the Chinese Army’s exploitation and looting of public and private properties (5) - Propaganda regarding the “Legitimacy of the Republic of Korea” (1) - Encouraging conflicts and dissensions between the Chinese or North Korean armies and the general public (3) - The US Army’s humanitarian policies, and propaganda regarding the goals of this war (19) - Blaming the other side for the delays on cease-fire negotiations (2), requesting fair treatments for the POWs (1)
Propaganda, Agitation and Publicity Work to Civilians (57 cases)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Propaganda on military achievements, information on the situation of the war, publicity works targeting the general public (27) - Agitating the South Korean public and the army (11) - Supporting the anti-Communist militia and asking for supporting for the US Army (5) - Warnings of imminent bombing or assaults (6) - Announcements barring people from moving along the frontline areas (8)

Source: Pang Sun Joo. 2000. *The Leaflets during the Korean War*. Institute of Asian Culture at Hallim University, pp. 43~293.

Note: Numbers inside parentheses indicate the number of cases of respective leaflet types.

tributed over the rear areas of enemy troops were in most cases dedicated to political and ideological assault, so it might be prudent for some sub-categories under the category of “Political and Ideological contents” in Table 1 to be moved to the category of “Propaganda, Agitation and Publicity Works to Civilians” in the same table.

During the time period between July 1951 and October the same year, 65% of the entire leaflets issued were distributed over the frontline areas, while 35% of them were distributed over the rear areas. 75% of the leaflets distributed over

Table 2. Themes of illustrations contained in leaflets distributed by the U.S. army
(Scale : %)

Operation Names	Message	Leaflet for Koreans	Leaflets for the Chinese
Bulldozer	Consider how strong we are; you are bound to lose ultimately; we have material superiority.	16.9(3)	11.8(3)
Skinsaver	Think of the chance you still have to save your life.		
Checkmate	Consider how hopeless your present tactical situation is.		
Home and Mother	Think how bad and resentful you feel because you are homesick.	20(1)	13.7(2)
Iago	Think of all the reasons you have for distrusting your superiors, your allies, your war aims, the Communists; you are being used.	11.8(4)	7.9(5)
Desdemona	Think how unselfish and horrible we and our war aims are; you can see (from our bomb warnings) that we don't want to hurt you.		
Nightingale	Think how well we'll treat you as a prisoner of war	19.4(2)	26.7(1)
Signpost	Think how safe it will be for you to surrender, if only you do the following things in the following way, etc.	6.7(5)	8.9(4)
Sweat and Toil	Think how bad you feel because of what you have to put up with (winter, digging foxholes, weariness, etc.)	6.7(5)	8.9(4)
Flag	Behave like a true patriot.		
Sand-in-Gears	Subversion		

Source: ORO-T-21 (FEC) "FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Leaflets." 1952. 8. 20, pp. 92~94.

Note: In cases of operations without percentage numbers indicated, it means that the percentage of such operations being respectively conducted was less than 5%. Numbers indicated in parentheses indicate the rank of that field, in terms of frequency of that operation being conducted.

the rear areas were aimed at civilian targets, 18% of them were at CPVA, and 7% of them at NKPA (Kendall et al. 1952).²

According to the theme and messages intended for the recipients, the U.S. army classified the leaflets into a number of “Operation” categories. Table 2 is the result of classifying the leaflets distributed during the time period between September 1950 and November 27, 1951 according to the themes indicated by the illustration therein. A total of 219 types of leaflet had illustrations upon them. 118 types were meant for Koreans, while 101 types were meant for Chinese.

Based on Table 2, we can determine what kind of leaflets were used in the heaviest fashion. Operation “Home and Mother,” meant for the NKPA and the North Korean civilians in the rear areas, was designed to instigate the enemy soldiers’ inner home-sickness by distributing leaflets with such contents. The number of leaflets distributed in the line of this Operation was the highest compared to the number of leaflets in other operations. Operation “Nightingale,” of which the number of leaflets distributed in line with it closely follows that of Operation “Home and Mother,” contained guarantees of a war prisoner’s safety and promised fair treatment. Operation “Bulldozer” showed contents demonstrating the sheer magnitude of both weapons and firepower of the U.S. Army, while Operation “Iago” suggested ideological and political criticism over the enemy’s cause for war and encouraged dissention within the enemy. Operation “Signpost” presented information regarding the ways of how to surrender.

In the meantime, leaflets meant for the CPVA showed a little difference in distributed numbers compared to the ones meant for the NKPA. While in cases of leaflets meant for the NKPA the numbers of leaflets from categories of Operation “Home and Mother” and “Nightingale” were almost the same (with only 0.6% of difference), in cases of leaflets meant for the CPVA, the ones from the category of Operation “Nightingale” were much more heavily distributed than those from the category of Operation “Home and Mother.” The percentage for Nightingale was almost two times that of ‘Home and Mother.’ Also, regarding the number of leaflets meant for the NKPA, the number of leaflets for Operation “Iago” was ranked 4th and leaflets for Operation “Signpost” was ranked 5th, but in cases of leaflets meant for the CPVA, the numbers are in reverse. It is an important little difference, as it shows that leaflets encouraging surrender were more heavily distributed over the Chinese troops than the North

2. This report surveyed situations that had occurred since the beginning of the war until late 1951, and was published in Summer 1952.

Korean troops. The U.S. Army was well aware that the Chinese troops were more susceptible to such encouragements as most of the troops were from the late Chinese Nationalist Army of the Chinese civil war era and therefore were certainly lacking the necessary amount of loyalty, which contrasted with the mind state of NKPA soldiers.

While Table 1 and Table 2 show us the classification based upon leaflet subject and message, Table 3 shows us the relationship between the themes of the leaflets, and the areas or receivers targeted for leaflet distribution. “Weekly Distribution Plans” were created by the U.S. Army’s Far East Command (FEC)’s Psywar Section, and were to distribute leaflets on a weekly basis during the time period between March 1951 and November the same year, over both the frontline areas and the rear areas. The “Results after Distribution Executed” indicate the percentage of leaflets distributed during the time period between September 1950 and November 1951, in terms of their respective themes.

The “Weekly Distribution Plans” show Operation “Nightingale” ranking most prominently, with Operation “Desdemona,” “Iago,” and “Bulldozer” following, in the field of “leaflets for frontline areas.” But the field of “leaflets for rear areas” shows the Operation “Desdemona” ranking most highly, and along

Table 3. Distribution of leaflets, classified in terms of themes, targeted areas, and targeted population (Scale : %)

Distribution Rate Operation Names	Weekly Distribution Plans (March 1951-November 1951)			Results after Distribution Executed (September 1950-November 1951)		
	NKPA Frontline	CPVA Frontline	Enemy Rear areas	NKPA Frontline	CPVA Frontline	Enemy Rear areas
Bulldozer	10	10	11	10.2	8.9	16.0
Skin saver	8	8	6	6.0	8.1	4.7
Checkmate	5	5	5	4.6	1.95	2.6
Home and Mother	6	5	9	1.3	5.6	1.1
Iago	9	12	20	28.7	28.05	28.9
Desdemona	13	14	40	7.8	11.6	34.8
Nightingale	38	37	3	17.4	16.2	
Signpost	5	4		21.1	17.2	0.2
Sweat and Toil	5	4	7	3.1	2.3	11.6
Total	99	99	101	100.2	99.9	99.9

Source: ORO-T-21 (FEC) “FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Leaflets.” August 20, 1952, pp. 36, 95~97.

with Operation “Iago,” occupying 60% of the entire leaflets. In the meantime, Operation “Signpost” was not even included in the weekly plans’ rear-area cases.

The “Results of Distribution Executed” also shows Operations “Nightingale” and “Signpost” were not conducted or only barely conducted in the rear areas because those operations were designed to deliver messages encouraging the soldiers to surrender or deliver information regarding how to do just that and because of such nature they were not that much useful in rear areas. For the rear areas, Operations such as “Desdemona” or “Iago” were planned to be conducted to deliver political and Ideological arguments under the objective of bringing down the enemy from within by criticizing the enemy’s cause for war and emphasizing or even outright justifying the U.S.’ position in the Korean War.

Unlike the direction intended indicated by the “Weekly Distribution Plans,” Operation “Iago” was heavily conducted (occupying almost 30% of the entire operations carried out) both in the frontline and rear areas. In cases of frontline areas, Operation “Signpost” ranked in second, and along with the percentage of Operation “Nightingale” they match the percentage of the Operation “Nightingale” shown in case of the “Weekly Distribution Plans.” Operation “Nightingale” and Operation “Signpost” both encouraged the recipients of the leaflets to surrender, but compared to Operation “Nightingale,” Operation “Signpost” presented more details regarding methods to do just that, so the operation was carried out more frequently than Operation “Nightingale.”

What exceeded the initial plans more than anything were the Operations “Iago” and “Desdemona” which contained political and ideological arguments. The U.S. scholars who were recruited to be consulted in the army’s efforts of psychological warfare supported distributing leaflets containing material which could touch the recipient’s personal issues, but the officers under the command of the FEC intelligence section argued that leaflets containing political and ideological agendas should be distributed more prominently. The raise in the number of leaflets distributed through Operations “Iago” and “Desdemona” shows us that there were some compromises made between those two clashing suggestions. Especially, the percentage of Operation “Iago,” through which leaflets containing materials criticizing the enemy’s cause of war politically and ideologically, rose significantly. In the case of rear areas, the percentage occupied by both leaflets distributed through Operations “Iago” and “Desdemona” was over 60%, as initially predicted in the original plans. Psywar warriors of the U.S. Army picked the name Iago and Desdemona, which were the names of the char-

acters that appeared in Shakespeare's play "Othello," to classify their operations distributing leaflets containing political arguments (ORO-T-21 (FEC) : 39).³

Comparing the theme-distribution ratio in the case of frontline areas to the case of rear areas, we can see that while in case of frontline areas leaflets containing material designed to touch personal issues occupied 60% of the entire amount, leaflets containing political and ideological propaganda occupied 40%, and in case of rear areas the percentage was reversed. This kind of ratio and percentages clearly mirror the intentions behind the psychological warfare effort.

75% of the leaflets created and distributed by the U.S. were targeted at enemy soldiers, while 25% of them were targeted at civilians. In the case of rear areas, U.S. psychological warfare employed a strategy of not encouraging direct actions such as sweep surrender, but encouraging sabotage in order to undermine the enemy's ability to continue its own war efforts, or stripping them of their own morale by exposing them to political and ideological assaults and as a result making them more vulnerable in terms of feeling inclined to surrender while they were actually dispatched to frontline tours of duty (Kendall et al. 1952: 92-94, 104-106). Yet regarding the frontline soldiers, the U.S. Army distributed leaflets containing materials blatantly encouraging them to surrender. Two thirds of the leaflets distributed by the U.S. Army encouraged surrender. These leaflets contained many levels of persuasion in order to persuade the recipient to decide to surrender more easily and more quickly. Operation "Home and Mother" was designed to manipulate soldiers to have thoughts of surrendering, while Operation "Skin saver" pressed them even harder to consider surrender. Operations "Nightingale" and "Signpost" were all the same, and Operation "Checkmate" also pushed the soldiers who were already considering surrender, literally over the edge.

It was not a mere coincidence that materials designed to touch personal issues inside the recipient were heavily contained in leaflets distributed by the U.S. Army. The U.S. social scientists, especially the psychologists, scholars majoring in journalism, and sociologists who strongly supported the theories of behaviorism were recruited in the U.S. psychological war effort. The Korean War provided American behavioral scientists with the very first opportunity to experiment on their own Behavioral theories in real-life situations.⁴ A group of

3. U.S. analysts argued that only Operations Iago and Desdemona harbored some political nature.

4. Traditional behaviorism was another school inside psychological studies that first appeared in early twentieth century America and mostly involved studies of human or animal response to

behavioral scientists were dispatched to the war zone to make predictions to devise controlling and manipulative models regarding the behavior patterns of both the U.S. troops and enemy soldiers. They served as consultants to the soldiers and politicians at various war zones including the frontline areas, the cease-fire negotiation table, and the detention camps (Robin 2001: 71). These scientists had quite a debate with the officials in charge of the psychological warfare under the command of the FEC, and actively maintained their argument that on the field of battle, inciting someone with some potential personal issues is much more effective than showering them with political faith or ideological propaganda.

This debate explains why material regarding personal interest and promises of compensation for the required actions were so heavily included in the leaflets distributed by the U.S. Army. It also provides us with a glimpse into the epistemological thinking patterns and research methodologies of the scholars who were dedicated to issues regarding prisoners of war, psycho-



Picture 1. Leaflets containing political and ideological content also made good use of the concept of Nationalism. Interestingly enough, the Dangun figure inside the picture is depicted with the image of Western features like Zeus or Jesus. And the soldiers are approaching him with gesture of repenting.

environmental influences or stimuli. Behaviorism denied any scientific validity to comments, consciousness, reasoning, sense, or emotion that all transcend the realm of mere action or the behavioral patterns of humans or animals. They regarded conscience a subject which could not be studied or researched in any traditional scientific fashion and argued that psychological studies should focus on action, and not consciousness. Behaviorism became the main trend of studies inside the American social science society in the post World War II era. During the 1950s the title “behavioral science” came to be used, referring to a field of social science studying the general principles of human action and behavior. In general terms, behavioral science should include sociology, social anthropology, cultural anthropology, psychology, ecology, economic science, geography, law, psychopathology and politics. This term was widely accepted in 1950s America, and was used with the same meaning as the term “social science.” It placed heavy emphasis upon psychology in analyzing societal matters, literally starting with psychological aspects in its elaboration of social phenomena, rejected any kind of abstract speculation, and regarded human action as motion committed in private and practical terms (Korean Association of Philosophy and Ideas 1989: 1414-1415; http://deluxe.britannica.co.kr/bol/topic.asp?article_id=b19j1474b and [b24h3877a](http://deluxe.britannica.co.kr/bol/topic.asp?article_id=b24h3877a)).

logical warfare, and North Korea. The U.S. psychological warfare conducted by the U.S. Army during the Korean War inherited its historical experience from World War II. Based upon the experience fighting the Nazis during that war, behavioral scientists came to consider assaults upon ideological symbols to be less effective and less successful than appealing to non-ideological issues involving the recipient. So, instead of directly attacking Kim Il Sung in any ideological manner, they simply launched questions regarding his authenticity. They were against the idea of deliberately praising democracy or verbally attacking Communism with strong ideological language. Such an idea was suggested by Charles A. Willoughby, chief of G-2 intelligence section and close aide to General MacArthur. He was one of the leading figures who were in charge of the early-stages of psychological operations; behavioral scientists were against his ideas. Instead, they thought psychological warfare could only end up with productive and favorable results when the enemy was in chaos, or in its terminal state or facing imminent defeat. So they insisted that promises of physical and economical compensation for surrendering, the insinuation of predicaments that their left-behind families of in rear areas would be facing if they did not surrender, and most importantly the assurances of safety and good treatment of the POWs should all be duly delivered to them at the exact time point when they would see this offer as a timely opportunity to save themselves. Finally, General Robert A. McClure who was in charge of U.S. Army psywar operations decided to issue leaflets containing both kinds of material and distributed them all at the same time, effectively solving the controversy (Robin 2001: 102-104).

Most of the leaflets distributed by the U.S. troops contained an illustration with a short line of propaganda. Illustrations were placed there in order to take advantage of the influential effect of strong images. They also used newspapers such as *Parachute News* (Nakhasan nyusseu) or the *Free World Weekly News* (Jayu segye jugan sinbo) published by the U.S. headquarters. They were in essence extended versions of an ordinary leaflet. Such newspapers were not meant to instigate certain actions among the enemy soldiers. They were instead meant to deliver information regarding the on-going events both domestic and foreign, but in the process that would virtually serve as another form of leaflet-involving a psychological operation. Lines that would be contained in the leaflets were drafted by FEC in Tokyo and the U.S. 8th Army in Korea (EUSAK). They were also in charge of producing leaflets. Distribution was taken care of solely by FEC before July 1951, but later, FEC came to take charge only in distributing the leaflets over the rear areas, and the EUSAK

newly assumed the task of distributing them over the frontline areas. FEC used B-29 bombers in their distribution efforts, while EUSAK used aircraft and artillery.

The Characteristics of NKPA and CPVA Leaflets—Types and Contents

Leaflets created and distributed by the NKPA and CPVA were a lot less in number than those distributed by the U.S. forces, but instead there were a great many types. Examined in this research are total of 306 types. The U.S. Army had the Tokyo-based FEC to take care of drafts and publication, and distributed leaflets through missile launches and airplanes. But the NKPA and CPVA showed a different fashion in all these procedures, as they respectively had the NKPA headquarters’ politburo and the CPVA headquarters take care of the “enemy collapse services,” and under their supervision, the lower echelons were also permitted to participate in drafting and publication. “Enemy Collapse Service” was the word they used as a counterpart to the U.S. term “psychological warfare.” The NKPA placed agents for such operations at every levels of corps, division, and brigade and had agitation agents stationed at every regiment and battalion to oversee the task. At the company level the deputy commanders from the politburo were in charge of the operations, and at the platoon level the platoon leaders were in charge. At the platoon level there were operation units specifically assigned to enemy collapse comprising of two or three men in each of every infantry unit.⁵ Units placed at the frontline areas not only distributed leaflets brought to them from higher levels, but also field-issued leaflets of their own design responding to unforeseen needs originating on the fields. These “temporal” leaflets show they were meant for “tactical” psychological warfare. 53 types of leaflet were hand-made, or printed in very crude quali-



Picture 2. News leaflet Parachute News distributed by the U.S. Army.

5. NKPA politburo, Office of Collapsing the Enemy, “Correspondence: Dear Colleagues at Every Level of Corps, Division, Regiment Assigned to Enemy Collapse Service-Regarding the Enemy Collapse Service,” date unknown (Pang 2000: 813).

ty, and these were all the aforementioned “temporal” leaflets. The NKPA had the Enemy Collapse Service’s agents distribute the leaflets first-hand. While U.S. troops employed the strategy of mass production and mass distribution, the NKPA employed a strategy comprised of smaller yet more versatile production, selective production answering to field needs, and small-scale distribution.

Unlike the U.S. troops, the NKPA did not usually distribute leaflets over civilian targets. There were few cases where that sort of distribution actually happened, and it seems it had something to do with the techniques employed in distribution. The NKPA and CPVA distributed leaflets using more interactive ways, like individual contact in the field through the actions of the infantry soldiers, while U.S. forces used airplanes and artillery to cover a much wider area.

The entities in ultimate charge of creating and distributing the leaflets, in the case of U.S. forces and the ROK army, included U.S. Army headquarters, EUSAK, and ROK’s Bureau of Public Information, entities that were all at the highest level of the governmental hierarchy.⁶ On the other hand, the entities in charge of the same task in the case of NKPA and CPVA were rather varied, including the NKPA headquarters (Central Politburo), CPVA headquarters, the NKPA field-command Cultural section, the Anti-Imperialist Alliance, the National Unification & Democracy Front, organizations of U.S. POWs, and field Enemy Collapse Service units.

The contents of the leaflets also bear some differences compared to those of the U.S. leaflets. 140 types of leaflet contained political and moral persuasion, and 165 types appealed to personal interest.⁷

The leaflets from the NKPA also showed illustrations with short lines of text, but prolonged articles also appeared with strong political propaganda (23 types out of 305). In a sense, the contents showed more logic than those of the U.S. leaflets, emphasizing indoctrination and persuasive logic, and contained more details and effective real-life examples. Various entities’ being involved in creating and distributing these leaflets actually seems to have paid off as proper and efficient responses to surrounding circumstances were enabled as a result. And the fact that leaflets for the officers and leaflets for enlisted men were separately

6. Amidst the psychological warfare using leaflets, the Korean government and the Korean Army took charge in conducting psychological operations targeted at South Korean civilians in the rear areas of U.S. troops. ORO-T-3 (FEC), p. 53.

7. One type of identified leaflet features English letters that caused the analysts some trouble in interpretation, so it is not included here.

Table 4. Contents and themes in leaflets distributed by North Korean and Chinese armies

Subject	Message
Persuasion through Political and Moral Tales (140)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Propaganda of the nature of the war, and the cause and objective supported by North Korea (The invasion of the American Imperialists, the theory regarding Rhee Syngman being a mere puppet, the favorable alliance between Korea and China, the War as a venture for economical gain only for the war mongers who are monopolistic capitalists, unification war, racist war, righteous war, civilian war) (87) - Demanding Cease-fire, blaming the impeding or delaying of the proceedings regarding the cease-fire negotiations (18) - Revealing war crimes (9) - <u>Supporting anti-war concepts and peace</u> (14) - Advertising the superiority of its own regime and ruling system (7) - <u>Blaming discriminate racial treatment being practiced within the US troops</u> (5)
Personal Interests (165)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Suggesting desertion or surrender (42) - Motivating enemy soldiers to feel home-sickness, elevating their concerns for the safety of their families and their fears of the potential destruction of their families, suggesting them to return to their homes (41) - Guaranteeing good treatment for POWs and compensation (27) - Eliminating their intention to fight, elevating their concern for potential defeat, motivating them to offer no support for the continuation of the war (29) - Advertising on broadcast schedules, requests for correspondence exchange (2) - Instigating inner conflict inside South Korean troops and US troops, specially encouraging conflict between Korean and US troops (24)

Source: Pang Sun Joo. 2000 *The Leaflets during the Korean War*. Institute of Asian Culture at Hallim University, pp. 295~730.

Note: Underlined themes are themes not identified within leaflets distributed by the U.S. Army




Picture 4. A U.S. leaflet with messages saying that while the Chinese troops are fighting in the field the U.S.S.R. army is destroying the families of the Chinese soldiers in China.



Picture 5. An NKPA leaflet showing the theme of U.S. soldiers' destroying Korean families.

of such mirror images. Those images, which eventually resulted in mirror images, led to each side's ironic copying of the other side's leaflets and contents. Raping women, collapsing families, emphasizing the predicament of the public inflicted upon them because of their leaders' exploitation were the most obvious examples. They were not only copying one another's illustrations, but themes as well.

On the other hand, the leaflets also show us the differences between both sides' military tactics, their ways of fighting a war and their own philosophy behind their war efforts. The U.S. leaflets, like the example of Operation Bulldozer, emphasized technical superiority and dominance in power. But North Korea was not in a position to display such strength in terms of weapons or firepower. Instead, they tried to argue the moral and political righteousness of their own system, and also denounced the American position of coming into the war in the first place. The NKPA also emphasized the concept of heroism, both in individual and collective terms on the basis of their admittedly achieved self-righteousness and victorious position. While the U.S. filled the leaflets with promises of personal safety guarantees and compensation instead of political and ideological propagand-



Picture 6. Leaflets do represent both sides' philosophy regarding the war. U.S. leaflets often featured significant emphasis upon their superior fire power and weapons.

da, the NKPA filled theirs with such propaganda and added some material regarding personal interests (Pang 2000: 804, 813).

The U.S. attacked North Korea politically and ideologically by denouncing the North Korean leadership as a puppet regime of the U.S.S.R. and this kind of attitude was heavily displayed in U.S. leaflets. For example, the main theme for Operation “Iago” was to spread the theory of a fake, “pseudo-Kim Il Sung” throughout enemy soldiers and the civilians, and to criticize the communist party’s harsh treatment of its public, and most importantly, to blame the entire communist leadership of North Korea for being a pathetic puppet. In the meantime, North Korea also attacked the U.S. and Korea by naming Rhee Syngman as a running dog on a leash serving the American interest. They also pointed out the ROK officials personal and public histories of previously serving the Japanese Imperial authorities during the Japanese occupation period. Both sides never hesitated to label their enemies as mere puppets, and tried to solidify such images and spread them. All these theories, criticisms and blaming involving images of fake identities and puppet serving was in the end how “cold war enemies” were created and evolved.

The quote below is an article contained in a leaflet produced with the theme of the so-called “Pseudo Kim Il Sung” theory, that was in itself one of the most typical themes used for leaflets at the time (Pang 2000: 212).

This man who claims to be the one certain Kim Il Sung, is a fraud who has deceived and lied to many fellow Koreans for a long time, and worst of all, masqueraded as Kim Il Sung himself who was one of the bravest heroes of the Korean people. This man is by no means Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung was born in 1885 and died in Manchuria 15 years ago. This fake Kim Il Sung was not even born until 1910. His real name is Kim Sung Ju, a Communist who was sent here to Korea by the Soviet Union in 1945. He pretended to be Kim Il Sung and tried to garner the faith of the people. He was successful at first, but now everyone knows the truth behind this man. The true Kim Il Sung was a military leader that fought admirably against the enemies of Korea. This Kim Sung Ju has led the Korean people to fight against each other, and turned Korea into ruins because of his greed for power and incompetence. This man is the true enemy of the Korean people.

The theory regarding the fake, pseudo Kim Il Sung here contains stories similar

to those introduced earlier in the <Bibliography of North Korean Leaders> contained inside “the Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army” published by FEC’s intelligence section.⁸


Considering recent studies and research, the facts revealed here are not presented accurately or to the truth, not to mention the obviously distorted interpretations of certain facts. The text or contents of the leaflets could contain false accusations in order to serve the leaflet’s own black propaganda purpose. But it is certainly a strange thing that an official manual, an authorized source of information like the one mentioned above could introduce facts regarding the Commander in Chief of the North Korean Army that were based upon nothing but “pseudo Kim Il Sung” theories. The FEC was certainly equipped with the most powerful and efficient intelligence gathering system and analysis ability throughout East Asia and had access to the intelligence reports or information collected by the Japanese police and military authorities during the Japanese occupation period. So it was not a difficult task for the FEC to pursue facts and confirm the authenticity of Kim Il Sung’s identity and the identity of the man who was being referred to as such. The fact that, with all the ability to confirm the authenticity or legitimacy of certain information, the FEC chose to issue a publication containing such false information not only strains the FEC’s own credibility and integrity, but also means that the FEC had a political agenda and also was in a certain political need to establish a myth featuring a fake figure called Kim Il Sung and to expand such a myth to the extent to which the myth would grow big enough to serve their own interests, literally having the U.S. Army fight against a fake Kim Il Sung who was nothing but a mere puppet of the U.S.S.R..

The fake pseudo Kim Il Sung theory, which was the embodiment of the puppet theories at the time, first appeared in U.S. based documents in early 1946,



Picture 6. A leaflet with information regarding the “Fake Kim Il Sung” figure on the back.

8. US Army Far East Command, G-2 Theater Intelligence Division, Operation Branch “Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army,” October 15, 1950. “Order of Battle” refers to the survey results of the command structure of enemy troops, conducted in order to determine the ability of the enemy stationed at field. Titles of units, number of troops, command structure, personnel, equipments, profiles of the commanders are all included.



Picture 8. A leaflet depicting China and North Korea as puppets of the U.S.S.R.

especially in the reports filed by the U.S. military government in Korea (National Archives of U.S. 1946). Following the trusteeship controversy news from the Moscow Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference at the end of 1945, the U.S. military government in South Korea started to view the Korean political landscape as in a left wing v.s. right wing conflict situation among factions supporting the Moscow agreement and other factions against trusteeship. This kind of view of the situation at the time was very different to other previous views earlier revealed in the U.S. and British policy documents issued before Korean liberation. These previous views mostly considered the Kim Il Sung faction as one of the most influential and active factions dedicated to the Korean national liberation movement at the time. So, the U.S. military government's relatively new perspective suggests a major shift in the U.S. intelligence authorities' view of the Korean situation, which was certainly led by the army authorities.

What should be noted regarding the emerge of puppet theories is how they first appeared, and what triggered that appearance. After the trusteeship controversy, the U.S. was in need of reevaluating the political factions of the Korean peninsula for their own interest, and that was when the puppet theories were first introduced. Same thing happened again when the U.S. reevaluated the Chinese regime after the Communization of China and opted to recognize it as a puppet regime of the U.S.S.R.. Right after the end of the World War II, the U.S. had dispatched George Marshall, who later became the Secretary of the State Department, to China who tried to arrange the coalition between the nationalist party and the communist party. But when the CPVA entered the Korean War, the U.S. abandoned the non-hostile attitude, officialized a hostile policy to People's Republic of China, and publicly started to call China "the puppet of U.S.S.R.." The Secretary of State Dean Rusk openly said on May 1951 that the People's Republic of China was merely a "Slavic Manchukuo" when troops were stalling along the area around the current cease-fire line and the U.N. was trying to pass the resolution of invoking economic sanctions against China (*Department of State Bulletin* 1951: 846-848).

The trusteeship controversy also provided North Korea with the same opportunity to engineer a similar puppet theory of their own, targeting political figures such as Kim Koo or Rhee Syngman. In spring of 1946, when the trusteeship controversy was heating up, they denounced these persons as traitors to the Korean people for being the embodiment of conglomerated entities of the feudal Chosundynasty leadership and pro-Japanese collaboration and also puppet figures serving foreign fascist imperialists (National Archives of U.S. 1946: 12). Interestingly enough, when the North Korean Army seized control of the South Korean realm, anti-American propaganda was heavily launched, but to a lesser degree compared to the anti-Rhee Syngman rants. In the areas occupied by the North Korean Army the main theme of propaganda targeting the South Korean civilians was the crimes and sins of the Rhee Syngman regime and the continuing theme contained Rhee Syngman's traitorous actions of selling the Korean people to U.S. imperialists, its corrupted officials, and also its exploitive social control. Anti-American propaganda included messages depicting the U.S. as monopoly capitalists who were intent upon exploiting Korean resources via the Rhee Syngman regime. But in the end, the rage was targeted more upon the Rhee Syngman regime, who was doing the "selling" anyway (Human Resources Research Institute 1951: 114-115).

The images of the enemy depicted inside the leaflets were not simple isolated images. In the case of images inside leaflets distributed by the U.S. Army, they were a representation of a cold war mentality viewing the world and humanity accordingly, and were also the embodiment of



Picture 9. A U.S. leaflet depicting Chinese leaders as puppets of the U.S.S.R.



Picture 10. An NKPA leaflet depicting Rhee Syngman as the running dog of U.S., and Japanese as invaders.

the U.S. way of viewing North Korea and China based upon its own political and economic interests and policies. We can see that from the fact that the North Korean puppet regime theory was first suggested by John R. Hodge, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army in Korea and also a “cold war warrior,” and the Chinese puppet regime theory was publicly addressed by the U.S. Secretary of State as mentioned above. Created images and perceptions of those images were established into a form of ideology through continued reproduction, and processed under systemized theorization. The Chinese puppet regime theory was only negated twenty years later when a diplomatic relationship was established between the U.S. and China, and the North Korean puppet regime theory had to wait another twenty years to be negated, along with the collapse of the U.S.S.R.

Concluding Remarks

The Korean War is mostly remembered as an ideological war. As the war progressed, the inherent ideological and international nature of the war became more and more apparent, and in the end ideological propaganda became a much more important issue than any other thing, even the actual outcome of the war. The Korean War served as a battle field in which the ideological aspects and concepts such as “arguable” morality were highly emphasized. Most of the major controversies involving the U.S. threat of using the atomic bomb, the probability of an occurrence of biological warfare, and issues regarding the prisoners of war were all suggested, emphasized, and debated in favor of psychological tactics and not based upon the actual on-going events of the war.

The U.S. partially served in substantially delaying the cease-fire negotiations with the issue of retrieving or sending back prisoners of war by ignoring the Geneva agreement which dictated automatic and compulsory exchanges and fair treatment of the POWs. The U.S. chose to allow free choices to POWs in this matter. It was their way of publicly announcing the U.S. moral superiority to the world, or the superiority of the Free World to that of the communized countries. During the early stages of negotiations, the U.S. did not have any established position regarding this issue, and some of the highest leaders of the military and officials of the State Department were predicting resolutions based upon the Geneva agreement. But it should be noted that the policy of allowing free choice was firstly suggested by the General McClure, who was in charge of psychologi-

cal warfare in the U.S. Army. This shows us that the issue of POW exchanges was approached by the U.S. as an issue which involved psychological tactics. A western researcher referred to the issue as a “substitute for victory,” considering the political and ideological nature of the issue (Foot 1990).⁹ The cease-fire negotiations were conducted at Panmunjeom, but the potential conclusion and results of the POW negotiations were bound to have an impact on the entire world, and Allen Dulles who was the director of CIA at the time depicted the cease-fire negotiations as one of the greatest victory achieved by the free world in the battles against communism.

The Korean War served as an international battlefield which required the combatants to play psychological warfare sometimes against each other, and sometimes targeting civilians who were in their territory or not. This led to the enforcement of an anti-communist sentimentality inside Korean society, the establishment of certain images according to such thinking, and the eventual hatching of numerous politically-colored images.

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9. The man who first used this kind of description was General MacArthur, the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces. Highly encouraged by the military success after the Incheon landing operations, he declared there was no “substitute for victory” even with the Chinese troops’ possible and potential entering into the war.

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