

The New Political Culture and Political Participation: A Cross-National and Cross-Civilization Assessment¹

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This research aims to investigate where South Korea stands with respect to the new political culture and political participation. In assessing the new political culture, this paper especially focuses on authoritarian/libertarian values. Drawing on Huntington and Inglehart's concepts of civilization, this article attempts to conduct a comparative study within and without civilization. Within East Asian cultural zone, in terms of libertarian attitudes South Korea stands much higher than Vietnam and China and lower than Japan. In comparing South Korean political culture with North European one, South Korea shows much less social tolerance than its counterparts and less libertarian attitudes than Sweden. On the contrary, South Korea's level of direct participation resembles that of the first world. Results of this study suggest "Big Sweden" as an example of future political development in South Korea.

Keywords: political culture, libertarian values, social tolerance, civilization

1. This article is funded by the Korea Research Foundation in 2005(B00010). Some parts of this paper has been presented at the Colloquium of the Department of Sociology, Beijing, Beijing University, July, 2006 and at the meetings of the Korean Association for Comparative Sociology, Seoul, November, 2006 as well as Special Symposium of the Korean Sociological Association, Kwangju, May, 2006. I thank Yan Ming, Du-shik Kim and other Chinese sociologists for their valuable comments. I would like to extend my appreciation for Gang-seo Bak and Mi-gyeong Yi for their assistance. Except the introductory part, the draft of this article is translated by Chung-mo Yoon to whom I owe appreciation.

This paper aims to investigate where South Korea stands with respect to the new political culture and political participation (Clark & Inglehart 1998: Clark 1998: Eder 1993). Cross-national studies among East Asian countries and civilization zones are conducted. Since the June Uprising in 1987, *Minjung* (People's) movements that once incorporated various movement organizations have lost its hegemony and *Minjung* discourses have been marginalized due to the emergence of new political identities (Chung et. al 2007). As the vision of proletarian revolution has faded out, how do we assess emerging political identity in ever revitalizing South Korean civil society? A clue may be found by reviewing what has happened in the West. It must be the new revolution in 1968 that broke up with the political culture and the way of political participation of the industrial society in the West. Ever since 1968, Marxist institutions and bureaucratic trade unions have gone downhill. On the other hand, Western societies witness the surge of issue-specific, anti-bureaucratic and participatory political culture that has such a variety of labels as post-Marxism, New Left, molecular revolution, libertarian attitudes, radical democracy, postmaterialism, and radical politics as well as the new political culture. These terms are mentioned in similar vein and this paper specifically focuses on libertarian attitudes (Kitschelt 1994: Flanagan & Lee 2003).

Drawing on Huntington (1996) and Inglehart's (1997) concepts of civilization, this article attempts to conduct a comparative study within and without civilization. By defining civilization as the broadest chunk of culture, Huntington suggests nine civilization zones such as Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Chinese. Despite of slight difference in demarcating civilization zones, Inglehart draws on Huntington and polishes his modernization model of political and cultural development. Inglehart's demarcation of civilization zones differs from Huntington's Protestant, Catholic, and Confucian. Unlike Huntington, Inglehart includes Japan in the Confucian civilization, divides Western civilization into Protestant and Catholic. Inglehart's version of modernization theory is rather sophisticated. While he argues that key variables of modernization theory such as economic development contribute to the global modernization and post-modernization, he pays heed to the unique path each civilization tracks. Based on the civilization perspective, this paper attempts to investigate a libertarian tendency and emerging mode of political participation between South Korea and East Asian countries within the Confucian civilization zone and also tries to understand the new political culture and political participation within South Korean society by comparing the Confucian civilization zone with Northwestern

European countries. This paper chooses political culture and participation in Protestant civilization zone because the phenomena of the new political culture are the most salient in this region.

Background of the New Political Culture

The emergence of the new political culture in Western society coincided with the social changes that the systems of the industrial society, appearing after the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution, waned and gave way to the emerging social transformation. These social changes can be understood as the declines of the old confrontation between Left and Right and the system of the industrial society as well as the surge of direct participation. Since the mid-twentieth century, class voting has declined to a great extent. For example, the rate of workers' support for the leftist party has considerably diminished. The loyalty of the class toward the party has declined since the 1960s. The rate of class voting in Sweden that had soared to 55% in the early 1960s shrank to 30% in the early 1990s (Inglehart 1990). This implies that the political cleavage between Left and Right moves to a different one and political issues become diversified (Kitschelt 1994; Knutsen 2004; Knutsen & Scarbrough 2004).

The institutions that lost confidence are labor union and political party, the most representative systems of the industrial society. As these huge organizations became gigantic bureaucracy far beyond the reach of the public, they come to show increasing interests in rather decentralized and horizontal organizations (Inglehart 1990; Chang 1995). The highly educated public interested in politics, tend to express their opinions by committing themselves to direct activities such as boycott and demonstration. Besides, except for the lower strata of working class, there are escalation of the skepticism of inefficiency of gigantic welfare states and demand for administrative efficiency.

As a structural background of the emerging political culture, the citizens of Western European welfare states have reached a point of marginal utility being virtually zero. Western European welfare states have been rapidly developed to a degree that they can spend 50% of GNP and meet the basic material needs. Such a phenomenon becomes a background that new social issues arise, replacing the existing issues on distribution of wealth. The transformation of occupational structures is another seedbed for nascent political culture. The expansion of welfare state and public sector promotes the increase of professionals that

produce the quality of life, unlike those skilled workers that produce material goods. Value shift is also responsible for emerging political cleavage. The societal emphases on subjective well-being redirect the political confrontation (Inglehart 1990: van Deth 2004: Chang Won-ho 1995). The change of values has occurred not only in the West but also in the “rest” of the world. The direction of such a value shift is a post-modern one different from either traditional or modern ones. On the basis of Weber’s argument, Inglehart (1997) suggests that post-modern values occur in the process of de-emphasis of authority that overcomes religious or rational-legal domination. The characteristics of post-modern values are to lay an emphasis on subjective well-being, e.g. an emphases on leisure and friends.

New Political Culture and Libertarian Attitudes

Despite the difference of the terms, the new political culture can be embodied in the formation of a new vertical axis in addition to a horizontal axis of conventional Left-Right dimension. The emerging vertical axis has been conceptualized as postmodernism/fundamentalism (Inglehart 1997), authoritarian/libertarian attitudes (Flanagan & Lee 2003: Kitschelt 1994), and radical politics/conservatism (Giddens 1994). Kitschelt suggests such a diagonal axis as left-libertarian/right-authoritarian (See also Evans et al. 1996). Flanagan and Lee (2003) depict authoritarian/libertarian dimension in the context of Inglehart’s path starting from religious to legal/rational authority to de-emphasis of authority. They argue that such double staged changes can be measured in a single frame such as authoritarian/libertarian attitudes. They contend that traditional people tend to be highly authoritarian, modern people intermediate and postmodern people least so. Kitschelt (1992) argues that libertarian inclinations involves European historical tradition related to anarchism and syndicalism and sympathizes with leftist direct democracy, self-organization and voluntary associations in making collective decision. Kitschelt’s (1994:22-3) description of libertarian values reminds us of Cohen and Arato’s discussion of civil society.

Libertarian politics envisions autonomous institutions beyond state and market (negative freedoms) that endow individuals with citizens’ right to participate in the governance of collective affairs (positive freedoms). Libertarians demand greater autonomy in shaping personal and collective

identities, the transformation of gender roles, and an ethic of enjoyment rather than of accumulation and order.

This paper examines whether a study on libertarian/authoritarian attitudes, mainly a study on Western society, would be applicable to South Korean society. One of the backgrounds of such political cleavage is a considerable degree of growth of welfare state, which cannot be applicable to South Korea. However, South Korean society is also experiencing the transformation of occupational structures and is joining in the global tide of postmodern values. Hence, a new cleavage is likely to emerge. The professionals of which counterpart tend to be strongly libertarian in Western society have continuously increased in South Korea and took 13.3% of the whole occupations in 2000. Moreover, there is a study that the axis of libertarian/authoritarian dimension can be applicable to non-Western societies including South Korea (Flanagan & Lee 2003; Lee 2003; Chung 2003a, 2003b).

Data, Methods, and Variables

This research draws on data from three waves of 1990, 1995-97, 1999-2001 World Values Survey. These series of surveys measure general population's political cultures and attitudes. Unless otherwise mentioned, this research analyzes the latest available wave data, i.e., 1999-2001 one. The methods used in this paper are factor analysis, crosstab analysis, one-way ANOVA analysis, ordered logistic regression analysis, T-test, etc. Factor analysis is applied to the item of authoritarian/libertarian attitudes; one-way ANOVA analysis to calculate the national mean of specific variables; T-test to compare the mean among civilization zones; ordered logistic analysis to measure the influence a libertarian tendency on unconventional political action. As each measure of unconventional political action is trichotomous, ordered logistic regression analysis is applied.

Country/Wave/Civilization: In the East Asian civilization, all the collected data about five countries are used. The five countries are Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and China. In the Protestant civilization, the most advanced five countries in the new political culture such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Iceland, Finland and Denmark are selected. The United States, a major state in this cultural zone is excluded as it has a firm belief in religion thus is less secularized. Because Taiwan and Vietnam are surveyed only in the 1995-97 and

2000 waves, there are limitations in comparing the two countries to others. Denmark, a major nation in the Northwestern civilization zone has to be also excluded in the analysis due to the lack of items to measure libertarian attitudes.

The Attitudes on Homosexuality: The measure of the attitudes on homosexuality is composed of 10 point scale. Drawing on Inglehart (1997), this variable is recoded that the points 1-5 may indicate homosexuality is unacceptable; the points 6-10 may show it is acceptable.

Authoritarian/Libertarian Measure: This paper borrowed Conformity/Deference Items from Lee's (2003) index. Flanagan and Lee (2003) use an index of 24 variables that should be too bulky to use in cross national studies of ten countries. When using all of the 24 items in a cross-national study, it is very probable that there will be a nation for lack of an item. Instead, this paper relies on Lee's simpler index. Table 1 reports the correlation among the variables of conformity/deference items and Table 2 shows the results of factor analysis with these variables in South Korea. The measure of conformity/deference is based on adding standardized scores of these items.

Unconventional Political Action: The degree of participation in unconventional political activities is measured by the question whether they have partic-

Table 1 Correlation of Subcomponents of Authoritarian/Libertarian Measure

	Good Manners	Independence	Superior's Instruction	Respect for Authority	Parental Responsibility	Relations between Parents and Children	4-Item Postmaterialism Index
Good Manners	1.000						
Independence	0.097	1.000					
Superior's Instruction	-0.002	-0.006	1.000				
Respect for Authority	0.044	-0.021	0.070*	1.000			
Parental Responsibility	0.015	0.139*	0.124*	0.141*	1.000		
Relations between Parents and Children	0.109*	0.044	0.025	0.076*	0.027	1.000	
4-Item Postmaterialism Index	0.086*	0.016	0.089*	0.088*	0.121*	-0.001	1.000

*:p<0.05

Table 2 Factor Loadings for the Measure of Authoritarian/Libertarian Measures

	Factor Loading	Eigen-value
Good Manners	0.359	
Independence	0.334	
Superior's Instruction	0.415	
Respect for Authority	0.496	1.39
Parental Responsibility	0.623	
Relations between Parents and Children	0.305	
4-Item Postmaterialism Index	0.496	

ipated in a petition, boycott, demonstration, strike or occupation, or might participate in them, or would never participate in them.

Results

1. Homosexuality as a Measure for the New Political Culture

One of the typical tendencies of the new political culture is social tolerance. As an important phase of social tolerance, this paper focuses on homosexuality and attempts to compare the attitudes among countries and civilization zones. The attitudes toward homosexuality have been often used as a barometer of social tolerance (Inglehart 1997). Among East-Asian countries, China shows the highest disapproval rate for homosexuality, no less than 99.5%. In Vietnam, the rate is 96.1%. Among East-Asian countries, Japan has the most tolerant attitude toward homosexuality. In Japan, about two-thirds of the respondents show disapproval. In South Korea, the rate is 86.3%, lower than those of China and Vietnam but considerably higher than that of Japan. Such variation within the Confucian civilization can be explained by the level of industrialization or modernization. Japan is ahead of all other East-Asian countries in tolerance toward homosexuals as it has accommodated to Western civilization earlier and comes closer to Western European countries in other social indexes than other East-Asian countries. Apparently, Japan has the most favorable conditions for social tolerance in East Asia by virtue of higher income and standard of education of senior citizens in particular as well as modernized occupational structures and rather long history of democracy (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Meanwhile,

Table 3 Disapproval Rate of Homosexuality

Countries	1990	1995	2000
South Korea	1117 (89.9%) N=1243	1147 (92.1%) N=1246	1035 (86.3%) N=1199
Japan	820 (89.6%) N=915	754 (77.7%) N=970	789 (65.8%) N=1200
Taiwan	Alternative	1325 (93.2%) N=1421	718 (94.2%)* N=762
China	960 (98.7%) N=973	1355 (98.1%) N=1381	879 (99.5%) N=883
Vietnam	None	None	867 (96.1%) N=902
Sweden	652 (65.3%) N=998	244 (26.0%) N=940	262 (26.8%) N=977
Netherlands	271 (27.2%) N=995	None	222 (22.2%) N=998
Iceland	362 (54.4%) N=665	None	288 (31.7%) N=908
Finland	382 (68.2%) N=560	606 (64.7%) N=936	592 (59.8%) N=990

* The Data of Taiwan is collected in 1995-97 that is included in the World Value Survey 2000 Wave

Vietnam and China have such results because over the half of the population are farmers and the above-stated social indexes of modernization are low. Obviously, an agricultural community should have a tendency against the new and the different because it is a homogeneous group and tends to stick to tradition. Taiwan has only the data of 1995-97 wave. Drawing on the same wave data, Taiwan has almost the same disapproval rate of 93% as that of South Korea's 92%. It is interesting that the similar results arose between the two countries that are located at a similar stage in economic development and democratic transition. Such a result shows that South Korean stereotypes toward Japan being militaristic are irrelevant.

1) Longitudinal Comparison on Social Tolerance

Table 3 indicates the results of a longitudinal comparison among East Asian and Northern European countries with the three wave data of 1990, 1995-7, and

1999-2001. Among East Asian countries, only South Korea, China and Japan have secured longitudinal data. As in Table 3, China has shown enduring strong disapproval against homosexuality for ten years, 99% in 1990, 98% in the wave of 1995-97 and 99.5% in 2000. On the contrary, Japan has shown steady decreasing tendency, 90% in 1990, 78% in the wave of 1995-97 and 66% in 2000. South Korea has not shown any particular change between 1990 and 1995 with 90% in 1990 and 92% in 1995 but dropped to 86% in 2000.

2) Comparison Between East-Asian and the Protestant Cultural Zones
 Meanwhile, this paper has made a comparison between Confucian and the Protestant civilization zone. The disapproval rate against homosexuality is 41% in Denmark, 27% in Sweden and 22% in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has such permissive social environment that the parliament came to legalize the same sex marriage around 2001 (Inglehart & Welzel 2005). Such favorable recognition of homosexuality in the Northwestern European countries might be derived from the influences of economic development and other cultural modernization and post-modernization. However, there might be a civilization factor. Compared with the secularized Protestant civilization zone that respects plurality and differences, the Confucian civilization zone must be exclusionary as far as social tolerance is concerned. The mean disapproval rate of homosexuality of the four countries in the Confucian civilization zone is 87% while that of the three Northwestern European countries is no more than 30%.

2. The New Political Culture and Authoritarian/Libertarian Attitudes

1) The Libertarian Index of East Asia

The analysis of a libertarian tendency of East Asian countries based on the 2000 data is as reported in Table 4 and Table 5. Table 5 shows the mean difference of the libertarian scores between two countries, with South Korea, Japan, and Sweden being reference category. The three East Asian countries show relatively very low scores: -0.68 of China, -1.14 of Taiwan and -2.39 of Vietnam. In particular, Taiwan that has been considerably industrialized and democratized shows a lower score than China. The data of Taiwan come from the 1995-97 wave thus it cannot be used for rigorous comparison. South Korea scores 0.12 and shows a significantly higher libertarian tendency than the above three countries. However, compared with 1.41 of Japan, it is a much lower score. Obviously, Japan shows significantly higher libertarian tendency than any other

Table 4 Libertarian Scores of Countries

Countries	Libertarian Index	N
South Korea	0.12	1189
Japan	1.41	944
Taiwan	-1.14	709
China	-0.68	739
Vietnam	-2.39	856
Sweden	1.38	852
Netherlands	0.19	969
Iceland	-0.030	851
Finland	0.13	875

country within the civilization. Such a result is consistent with that of the attitudes toward homosexuality.

2) Cross-Civilization Scores of Libertarian Attitudes

This research has excluded Denmark for its lack of data. Finland, the Netherlands and Iceland score 0.19, 0.13 and -0.03 respectively, which is lower than expected. Statistically, there was no significant difference between South Korea and these countries and the scores of those three countries are lower than that of Japan. However, only further study on the cultural characteristics of these countries would provide an answer to why their libertarian scores are lower than that of Japan.

Sweden that has an overwhelmingly tolerant attitude toward homosexuality, attains a libertarian score 1.38, virtually equal to that of Japan. This score is much higher than those of Northwestern European countries and East Asian countries except Japan. Once again, it is confirmed that Sweden, a model welfare state shows the most advanced feature in various indicators of political culture.

3) Comparing the Two Civilization Zones

As in Table 6, the mean libertarian score of East Asian civilization is -0.42, which is significantly lower than that of Northwestern European countries of which mean score is 0.74. However, due to high intra-civilization variation, the cross-civilization comparison has limitation. Besides, there are differences in the number of samples among countries and this problem is not addressed.

Table 5 Mean Differences of Authoritarian/Libertarian Scores by Countries

Standard Nation	Target Nation	Mean Error (Standard Deviation)
South Korea	China	0.80 (.12)*
	Taiwan	1.26 (.12)*
	Finland	-0.01 (.12)
	Iceland	0.15 (.12)
	Japan	-1.29 (.11)*
	Netherlands	-0.07 (.11)
	Vietnam	2.51 (.12)*
	Sweden	-1.26 (.12)*
Japan	China	2.09 (.13)*
	Taiwan	2.55 (.13)*
	Finland	1.28 (.12)*
	Iceland	1.44 (.12)*
	South Korea	1.29 (.11)*
	Netherlands	1.22 (.12)*
	Vietnam	3.80 (.12)*
	Sweden	0.03 (.12)
Sweden	China	2.10 (.13)*
	Taiwan	2.52 (.13)*
	Finland	1.25 (.13)*
	Iceland	1.41 (.13)*
	Japan	-0.03 (.12)
	South Korea	1.26 (.12)*
	Netherlands	1.19 (.12)*
	Vietnam	3.77 (.13)*

* p < 0.05

Table 6 Comparison of Mean Scores among Cultural Zones

Cultural Zones	N	Mean	T Score	Degree of Freedom
Confucian	4437	-0.42	-15.21**	6257
Protestant	1822	0.74		

**p<0.01

3. The New Political Culture and Political Participation

With the emergence of the new political culture, the landscape of political participation has undergone dramatic transformation. The interest in extra-institutional and active participation in issue-specific politics has increased, while the public interests in institutionalized and passive political participation like voting on the basis of such existing bureaucracy as political party and labor union has decreased. As mentioned above, unconventional political activities such as petition, boycott, demonstration, and strike have emerged as a new way of political participation responding to the new political culture. This study conducts a comparative study on new mode of political participation in East Asian and Northwestern European countries.

1) Participation into Unconventional Political Activities

Petition: Table 7 and 8 report frequencies of participation into unconventional political action in East Asian and Protestant Countries, respectively. The percentages of participation into petition, the most moderate unconventional political activity are 5.6% in Vietnam, 11.1% in Taiwan and 52.3% in South Korea. The petition rate of Japan is 63.2%, 11% higher than that of South Korea. In East Asia, Japan and South Korea show over 50% of participation rate. In Northwestern Europe, Sweden surpasses other countries in petition. The 87.4% in Sweden excels other Protestant countries: 59.1% in the Netherlands, 56.8% in Denmark and 53% in Iceland. Among East Asian countries, South Korea and Japan also show a considerably higher rate of participation in petition than other countries in the region, no less than those of Northwestern countries except Sweden.

Boycott: The percentages of participation in boycotts are 0.6% in Vietnam, 3% of Taiwan, 10.1% in South Korea and 8.4% in Japan. South Korea shows higher rate of participation than that of Japan and excels other East Asian countries in participatory politics. Among Northwestern European countries, Sweden stands at the top with 33%; Denmark holds the second place with 24.9%. Northwestern European countries show remarkably higher rate of participation in boycott than East Asian countries, which might be attributable to the fact that as a way of civil disobedience, boycott may be an unfamiliar repertoire of contention in this region.

Table 7 Frequencies of Participation into Unconventional Political Activities of East Asian Countries

Countries		Types of Unconventional Political Activities				
		Petition	Boycott	Demonstration	Strike	Occupying
South Korea	Have participated	567 (52.3%)	88 (10.1%)	224 (22.7%)	91 (9.5%)	No Data
	Might participate	402 (37.1%)	536 (61.8%)	440 (44.5%)	526 (54.7%)	
	Would never participate	115 (10.6%)	244 (28.1%)	324 (32.8%)	345 (35.9%)	
N		1084 (100.0%)	868 (100.0%)	988 (100.0%)	962 (100.0%)	
Taiwan	Have participated	81 (11.1%)	22 (3.0%)	18 (2.5%)	2 (0.3%)	0 (0.0%)
	Might participate	262 (35.8%)	236 (32.6%)	261 (35.8%)	84 (11.7%)	38 (5.2%)
	Would never participate	388 (53.1%)	466 (64.4%)	450 (61.7%)	632 (88.0%)	694 (94.8%)
N		731 (100.0%)	724 (100.0%)	729 (100.0%)	718 (100.0%)	732 (100.0%)
Japan	Have participated	773 (63.2%)	90 (8.4%)	131 (12.9%)	27 (2.7%)	1 (0.1%)
	Might participate	362 (29.6%)	687 (64.2%)	374 (36.8%)	196 (19.4%)	84 (7.7%)
	Would never participate	88 (7.2%)	293 (27.4%)	511 (50.3%)	788 (77.9%)	1005 (92.2%)
N		1223 (100.0%)	1070 (100.0%)	1016 (100.0%)	1011 (100.0%)	1090 (100.0%)
Vietnam	Have participated	52 (5.6%)	5 (0.6%)	18 (1.9%)	3 (0.3%)	10 (1.2%)
	Might participate	435 (46.5%)	147 (16.2%)	354 (38.0%)	96 (10.5%)	187 (22.2%)
	Would never participate	448 (47.9%)	753 (83.2%)	56 (60.1%)	818 (89.2%)	645 (76.6%)
N		935 (100.0%)	905 (100.0%)	932 (100.0%)	917 (100.0%)	842 (100.0%)

Table 8 Frequencies of Participation into Unconventional Political Activities of Northwestern European Countries

Countries		Types of Unconventional Political Activities				
		Petition	Boycott	Demonstration	Strike	Occupying
Denmark	Have participated	565 (56.8%)	244 (24.9%)	291 (29.3%)	218 (22.2%)	28 (2.8%)
	Might participate	270 (27.1%)	361 (36.8%)	390 (39.3%)	302 (30.8%)	120 (12.1%)
	Would never participate	160 (16.1%)	376 (38.3%)	311 (31.4%)	461 (47.0%)	845 (85.1%)
N		995 (100.0%)	981 (100.0%)	992 (100.0%)	981 (100.0%)	993 (100.0%)
Finland	Have participated	486 (49.5%)	141 (14.5%)	142 (14.6%)	24 (2.5%)	1 (0.1%)
	Might participate	361 (36.8%)	520 (53.5%)	427 (43.8%)	241 (25.0%)	145 (15.0%)
	Would never participate	134 (13.7%)	311 (32.0%)	405 (41.6%)	698 (72.5%)	822 (84.9%)
N		981 (100.0%)	972 (100.0%)	974 (100.0%)	963 (100.0%)	968 (100.0%)
Iceland	Have participated	508 (53.0%)	170 (17.8%)	198 (20.7%)	32 (3.4%)	7 (0.7%)
	Might participate	356 (37.2%)	565 (59.3%)	568 (59.4%)	280 (29.6%)	116 (12.2%)
	Would never participate	94 (9.8%)	218 (22.9%)	191 (20.0%)	635 (67.1%)	827 (87.1%)
N		958 (100.0%)	953 (100.0%)	957 (100.0%)	947 (100.0%)	950 (100.0%)
Nether-lands	Have participated	592 (59.1%)	214 (21.4%)	313 (31.2%)	43 (4.3%)	49 (4.9%)
	Might participate	297 (29.7%)	385 (38.5%)	368 (36.8%)	282 (28.1%)	234 (23.4%)
	Would never participate	112 (11.2%)	402 (40.2%)	320 (31.9%)	677 (67.6%)	718 (71.7%)
N		1001 (100.0%)	1001 (100.0%)	1002 (100.0%)	1002 (100.0%)	1001 (100.0%)
Sweden	Have participated	884 (87.4%)	329 (33.0%)	352 (35.2%)	45 (4.6%)	26 (2.6%)
	Might participate	103 (10.2%)	547 (54.8%)	527 (25.8%)	465 (47.5%)	187 (19.0%)
	Would never participate	25 (2.5%)	122 (12.2%)	120 (12.0%)	469 (47.9%)	771 (78.4%)
N		1012 (100.0%)	998 (100.0%)	999 (100.0%)	979 (100.0%)	984 (100.0%)

Lawful Demonstration: Table 7 shows that Taiwan and Vietnam have relatively low rates of participation into lawful demonstration, 2.5% and 1.9% respectively. On the contrary, the rate of South Korea reaches 22.7%, surpassing those of other East Asian countries and amounting to twice as much as Japan's 12.9%. The highest rate of South Korea may be attributed to numerous public rallies during the 1980s including the June Uprising in 1987. Among the Protestant countries, Sweden stands at the top with 35.2% and the Netherlands and Denmark attains around 30% participation. Even such country as Finland having regional lowest rate shows higher rate than Japan's 14.6%.

Illegal Strikes: Most of the countries show the rate of participation under 10% in the illegal strikes that are high-risk unconventional political activities. While Vietnam and Taiwan shows 0.3% equally and Japan stands at 2.7%, South Korea shows 9.5%, more than double the rate of Sweden's 4.6% and stands highest except Denmark's 22.2%. It may be partly because of South Korean government's relatively exclusive stand on labor and the labor movements' subsequent militant reaction.

In case of Western countries and Japan, they may have chosen unconventional political participation due to skepticism and disillusion with political parties and parliamentary politics that once prevailed in the industrial society. In case of South Korea, things look complicated. It is not clear whether relatively high level of participation in unconventional political activities has resulted from the disillusion with party politics or from the necessity to supplement the role of immature parliamentary and party politics. The latter attribution involves the argument that civil legislation movements of such voluntary association as the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy supplements the functions of political parties (Cho 2004).

2) A Libertarian Tendency and Political Participation

This article examines whether libertarian political inclination, a major element of the new political culture would have an influence on each type of unconventional political action, conducting ordered logistic analyses with each unconventional political action as a dependent variable and a libertarian tendency as an independent variable. As in Table 9, among East Asian countries, libertarian tendency has a positive influence on the four types of demonstration except "occupying buildings and factories" in South Korea. This item is missing in South Korea survey. With regard to South Korea, the coefficient of petition 0.071

Table 9 Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficient for Unconventional Political Activities on Libertarian Attitudes-I

Countries	Petition		Boycott		Demonstration	
	B (S.E)	-2 log Likelihood	B (S.E)	-2 log Likelihood	B (S.E)	-2 log Likelihood
South Korea	0.071* (0.02)	482.24 N=1075	0.096* (0.03)	414.52 N=863	0.121* (0.02)	512.35 N=981
Japan	0.024 (0.03)	537.93 N=877	0.118* (0.03)	476.78 N=778	0.080* (0.03)	560.30 N=744
Taiwan	0.188* (0.03)	446.86 N=677	0.150* (0.03)	356.95 N=671	0.143* (0.03)	372.90 N=674
Vietnam	0.016 (0.03)	367.32 N=829	0.059 (0.04)	191.92 N=803	-0.005 (0.03)	332.91 N=829
Sweden	0.120* (0.04)	376.58 N=852	0.153* (0.02)	697.05 N=841	0.135* (0.02)	674.54 N=840
Netherlands	0.162* (0.02)	725.05 N=968	0.206* (0.02)	840.21 N=968	0.223* (0.02)	804.25 N=969
Iceland	0.143* (0.03)	424.67 N=846	0.173* (0.03)	701.47 N=843	0.158* (0.03)	710.15 N=844
Finland	0.127* (0.02)	671.87 N=836	0.148* (0.02)	703.92 N=831	0.137* (0.02)	728.20 N=836

*: p,0.05

means that, other things being equal, the odds of being classified as “have participated” versus “might participate” or “would never participate” would be 113% greater with a one unit increase in the libertarian attitudes(See Liao 1994).

In South Korea and Japan, a libertarian tendency similarly appears significant as to boycott, lawful demonstration and illegal strike. However, as to petition the independent variable appears significant for South Korea but not for Japan. Because petition is a rather less risky activity it may have less correlation with libertarian tendency. In case of occupying buildings and factories, South Korea does not have relevant data. In Japan, since there is only one case for the item, the results virtually mean nothing. In Taiwan, a libertarian tendency appears to have a significantly positive effect on four types of unconventional political action except occupying buildings and factories. Those who have participated in strikes and “occupying buildings and factories” are only one and ‘none’ respectively, which is statistically meaningless for the insufficient cases. In Vietnam, a libertarian tendency appears to have no impact on any political action. It may be irrelevant to apply libertarian measure to Vietnam because of

Table 10 Ordered Logistic Regression Coefficient for Unconventional Political Activities on Libertarian Attitudes-II

Countries	Petition		Boycott	
	B (S.E)	-2 log Likelihood	B (S.E)	-2 log Likelihood
South Korea	0.107* (0.02)	461.89 N=956		
Japan	0.114* (0.03)	369.72 N=737	0.081 (0.06)	199.42 N=797
Taiwan	0.129* (0.04)	188.67 N=663	0.027 (0.06)	134.47 N=678
Vietnam	0.145* (0.04)	167.42 N=814	0.016 (0.03)	242.66 N=748
Sweden	0.111* (0.02)	602.93 N=829	0.158* (0.03)	433.59 N=830
Netherlands	0.177* (0.02)	640.49 N=969	0.248* (0.03)	575.02 N=969
Iceland	0.165* (0.03)	568.99 N=839	0.136* (0.04)	372.61 N=841
Finland	0.163* (0.03)	504.81 N=824	0.190* (0.04)	311.07 N=831

*p<0.05

such low libertarian tendency in general. No valid results could be attained because the respondents who had actually participated in the other political activities except petition are less than twenty.

Overall, due to the low participation rates render Vietnamese cases irrelevant. In case of the three countries of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, the independent variable appears to have significant effects on boycott, demonstration and illegal strikes in Japan and South Korea. In Taiwan and South Korea libertarian tendency has significant effects on all other political activities except occupying buildings and factories. In all of the East Asian countries, it is next to impossible to assess the impact of libertarian attitudes on “occupying buildings and factories” due to the too few cases.

Table 9 and 10 shows that in Northwestern European countries, libertarian tendency has consistently positive effects on all the five items of unconventional political action. In these countries, unlike in Japan, libertarian attitudes have valid impact on occupying buildings and factories. However, the limitation of these analyses of the impact of libertarian values on political action is that the

regression coefficient is relatively small. The highest odd ratio is only 1.25 in case of demonstration as a dependent variable in the Netherlands.

Conclusion

This paper examines libertarian tendency as the new political culture as well as its influence on various unconventional political action, which are active forms of participation. Concerning attitude towards homosexuality, one of the criteria of libertarian tendency in a broad sense, we see growing level of tolerance on it in South Korea and Japan. In the Confucian cultural zone, South Korea has shown higher social tolerance than China and Vietnam and lower social tolerance than Japan. In South Korea, despite a little decreasing tendency, 86% of people have still disapproved homosexuality, leaving much room for improvement in social tolerance. This result implies that South Korean level of tolerance is far behind those Protestant countries in this research of which average disapproval rate is below 30%.

Analyzing libertarian attitudes with a more systematic measure, not with just a single variable of homosexuality, I find South Korea standing much higher than Vietnam and China and lower than Japan among East Asia countries. In comparison with Protestant countries, the libertarian score of South Korea is much lower than that of Sweden and almost the same as those of the Netherlands and Finland. However for a definitive result, we need more analyses of data. We may need to investigate whether only Sweden stands highest in Western countries or other countries such as France and Germany stand as high as Sweden. Also, further study should be conducted on the libertarian measure, developed by Flanagan and Lee (2003). Because that measure originally intends to examine Korean and Japanese new political culture, it may not be applicable to Protestant countries. For example, the measure of attitude on “parents’ own life more important” may be relevant to measure libertarian tendency in East Asia but it may have much different nuance in the Protestant cultural context. Also, there should be more research on what makes the South Korean libertarian score much lower than that of Japan.

Another finding is that South Korean level of direct participation does not fall far behind countries in the East Asian and even in Protestant cultural zones. South Korea appears to resemble the first world not just in economic development but in political participation. However, the uneven development of political

culture in South Korea draws out attention; what makes the participation in unconventional political action salient while other social indices report relative backwardness? Another question raised is how are the rates of participation in boycott, demonstration and strike in South Korea higher than those of Japan despite the libertarian score of South Korea being much lower than that of Japan.

The results of this paper run contrary to Korean public belief on Japanese political culture. Japan excels South Korea in overall libertarian tendency. Japan turns out to be far less militaristic and intolerant than most of Koreans imagine. Steady economic growth and high standard of living should render Japanese society to subscribe postmodern values and attitudes. Along with Japan, Sweden draws out attention. Among ten sample countries in this research, Sweden seizes outstanding first place in all of the indicators of homosexuality, libertarian values, and unconventional activities. There is a “big Sweden or small United States” disputes on the model of South Korea’s future development. As far as political culture is concerned, big Sweden should be the target.

Finally, future research should address indicator limitations in this research. The new political culture has arisen and been expanding at the global scale even though its epicenter is in Protestant civilization. Admittedly, we do not have satisfactory measures for the new political culture or libertarian values. Because of the decentralization, segmentation, and diversification, i.e., postmodernization of societies, the magic indicator might not be possible. At present, such indicators as material/ postmaterial, survival/ well-being and Kitschelt’s libertarian/ authoritarian measures including the indicators used in this paper have been developed but we may still have long way to go to come up with a decent new political culture indicator.

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